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The language of evil has become popular, especially in the era after the Holocaust. The 
sense of evil relevant here is the strong sense – that which goes beyond the pale of ordinary 
wrongness and expresses our strongest moral condemnation. But what exactly makes an 
action evil? There are basically three approaches adopted by most theorists of evil to answer 
that question. The victim approach considers the harm suffered by the victims; the perpetrator 
approach the perpetrator’s psychology; and the combination approach factors pertaining to the 
victim and perpetrator. Despite using different approaches, most theories of evil actions seek 
to make sense of evil as a special moral category that is quantitatively and/or qualitatively 
distinct from mere wrongness. This thesis aims to enrich our understanding of what makes an 
action evil by examining six theories of evil actions and offering an alternate theory that will 
avoid their shortcomings. It also proposes three conditions that a theory of evil actions should 
meet in order to be considered robust. In my opinion, a robust theory of evil actions is one 
that is balanced, intuitively plausible and useful. Based on these criteria, my contention is that, 
despite offering insight into the nature of evil actions, the six theories fail to be sufficiently 
robust. This then makes way for my formulation of a better alternate theory. 
Chapter 1 introduces the strong sense of evil, the qualitative thesis and the criteria for a 
robust theory of evil actions, which are crucial to my arguments; it also states the aim, 
approach and relevance of my project. 
Chapter 2 examines two theories taking the victim approach, as proposed by John Kekes 
(1990) and Claudia Card (2005, 2010) respectively, while Chapter 3 two theories taking the 
perpetrator approach, as proposed by Ernest V. Garcia (2002) and Hillel Steiner (2002) 
respectively. My conclusion is that these theories are not sufficiently robust for the following 
reasons: (1) they fail to be balanced, as they rely mainly on either victim or perpetrator factors 
to conceive of evil actions; (2) certain parts of their accounts seem intuitively implausible; 
and (3) their usefulness is limited.  
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Chapter 4 examines two theories adopting the combination approach, as proposed by Paul 
Formosa (2008) and Stephen de Wijze (2002) respectively. My conclusion is that, despite 
meeting the condition of balance, these theories fail to satisfy the other two conditions 
adequately and so are not sufficiently robust. 
In view of the deficiencies of these six theories, Chapter 5 offers an alternate theory that 
seems to satisfy the criteria for a robust theory of evil actions adequately. This theory has two 
components. The victim component outlines a condition that has to do with the sort of harm 
imposed on another while the perpetrator component three necessary psychological 
conditions. On my view, evil actions are immoral actions that essentially reflect a flagrant 
disrespect or disregard for the human worth and life of another person. 














The recent decades have seen a surge of theories of evil in moral philosophy. For instance, 
John Kekes (1990), Claudia Card (2005, 2010), Ernesto V. Garcia (2002), Hillel Steiner 
(2002), Paul Formosa (2008) and Stephen de Wijze (2002) are among the emerging theorists 
of evil who offer developed accounts of evil. Most of them try to make sense of evil as a 
special moral category that is distinct from ordinary, even extreme, wrongness or badness. 
This interest in evil as a distinct moral category is generated by the popular usage of the term 
‘evil’ – especially in the era after the Holocaust – to refer to specially horrifying moral 
phenomena, which other terms of negative moral appraisal (such as ‘bad’ and ‘wrong’) do not 
seem to adequately describe. For instance, it does not seem adequate to describe the genocidal 
actions of the Nazis as wrong or very wrong; they are downright evil – few people, if any, 
would have quarrel with this moral ascription for such heinous crimes. 
1.1 The Strong Sense of Evil 
Yet, given that the term ‘evil’ has several distinctive senses in the English language, 
which sense is the one relevant here? In ordinary language, there are five notable senses of the 
term ‘evil.’ First, evil in the axiological sense is equivalent to ‘bad’ (Formosa, 2008, p. 217): 
it refers to everything adverse in human experience such as moral evils and natural evils 
(Garrard, 2002, p. 320). Moral evils are bad things brought about by human agency (e.g. wars) 
while natural evils are bad things caused by natural elements (e.g. earthquakes). Second, evil 
as featured in expressions such as ‘a necessary evil’ and ‘the lesser of two evils’ is loosely 
equivalent to “something one doesn’t like or finds undesirable,” but must do or accept for the 
sake of something better (e.g. root canal) (Singer, 2004, p. 186); here, evil is used figuratively, 
which need not have moral overtones. Third, evil in the demonic sense has to do with dark 
metaphysical beings such as Satan and demons who are fiercely opposed to God and all that 
is associated with or loved by Him; evil here essentially refers to the property possessed by 
them (Gelven, 1983, p. 201). Fourth, evil in the weak (moral) sense is effectively synonymous 
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with ‘wrong’ (Southwold, 1985, p. 131); it refers to “the whole range of human immorality” 
from the most petty to the most heinous (Garrard, 2002, p. 320). Hence, both lying and 
genocide can be coherently called evil in this sense. Fifth, evil in the strong (moral) sense 
refers to “something over and above ordinary badness”; it expresses our harshest moral 
condemnation as well as our utter horror and revulsion (Singer, 2004, p. 190). To say that 
something is evil is to render it the heaviest moral judgment there is. In other words, evil in 
the strong sense is “never trivial” but always “carries with it an enormous moral gravity” 
(Formosa, 2008, p. 217); it denotes wrongs so unspeakably vile and offensive that it seems 
impossible to forgive them. To some extent, the strong sense of evil also denotes something 
sinister. Based on the strong sense, then, lying cannot be described as evil, for it is too trivial 
and not particularly revolting or sinister. On the other hand, genocide can be properly called 
evil in this sense; the ethnic cleansing in former Bosnia-Herzegovina is one paradigmatic case. 
Of these different senses, it is evil in the strong sense that is engaged by contemporary 
theorists of evil. It is also the sense with which my thesis is concerned. Hence, the term ‘evil’ 
without qualification, as appeared in this thesis, always refers to the strong sense.      
That said, it does not matter that evil in the strong sense may not have an equivalent in 
other languages. For instance, evil is usually translated into ‘böse’ in German, but ‘böse’ is 
not also used in the strong sense as in English (de Wijze, 2002, note 8). What matters is that 
the English term ‘evil’ is useful in characterizing certain aspect of our moral reality, where 
other negative moral terms fail to do so adequately. It is likely that most other languages 
describe this particular aspect of our moral reality in terms that may not be directly translated 
into the English term ‘evil.’ The issue here is, of course, not just about semantics – that would 
be missing the point. The issue here, rather, is that a specific conception of evil is implicitly at 
work in the everyday use of the term ‘evil.’ 
1.2 The Qualitative Thesis 
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Therefore, it is exploring evil in the strong sense that is a relatively new enterprise in 
moral philosophy. Apparently, an increasing number of thinkers have come to recognize the 
use of ‘evil’ in the strong sense to describe actions, persons, characters, events, practices, 
programs, institutions, organizations and so on in common moral discourse (Singer, 2004, pp. 
189-190). Their aim in formulating theories of evil is thus to make explicit our implicit 
understanding of evil in the form of a conception of evil – i.e. what, in their opinion, makes 
something evil. This involves making a distinction between evil and wrong, so as to cohere 
with the strong sense of evil as used in everyday discourse. But the question is: how to make 
sense of evil as a significant moral category that is unequivocally distinct from mere 
wrongness? 
Some thinkers, like Luke Russell (2007), suggest that the distinction is simply a 
quantitative intensification of wrongness. For instance, if physically assaulting a person to 
cause him light injuries is wrong, then physically assaulting him to cause him fatal injuries 
will be evil. Here, evil is simply an increase or intensification of wrongness in terms of degree, 
which, in this case, is determined by the extent of the injuries. But some, like Steiner (2002), 
hold that evil is a “wrong-intensifier” not just in the quantitative but also in the qualitative 
sense – meaning that something is not just wrong but evil in virtue of some additional quality 
or qualities (Steiner, 2002, p. 184). For instance, Steiner argues that the pleasure one takes in 
doing wrong constitutes a distinctive quality that renders an action evil (2002, p. 189). I shall 
call the view of the qualitative nature of evil the qualitative thesis. 
Yet, not all theorists of evil accept the qualitative thesis. Formosa finds the general claim 
that there is a qualitative difference between evil and wrong “unconvincing for two reasons” 
(2008, p. 218). First, whether evil is qualitatively or quantitatively distinct from ordinary 
wrongdoing is contingent on how a theorist defines evil (ibid.). He cites an example: one who 
holds harmful consequences as the sole deciding factor for the ascription of evil will also hold 
the same for the ascription of wrongness (ibid.). What he is implying here is that harm comes 
in degrees, and so a conception of wrong and evil based solely on the severity of harm does 
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not seem compatible with the qualitative thesis. Second, Formosa thinks it possible that, in 
some cases, ‘evil’ and ‘very wrong’ are interchangeable, depending on “taste and practice, but 
our intuition is that we should never do this as it is disrespectful to the victims of evil” (ibid.). 
Hence, he advises readers not to assume that the qualitative thesis is, or must be, true 
generally (ibid.). 
Here, I want to briefly counter Formosa’s objections. With regard to his first reason, it 
seems that Formosa is missing the point. There appears to be no logical connection between 
the fact that some theorists conceive of evil in the quantitative sense and the conclusion that 
the qualitative thesis is not true generally. I do not think his first reason amounts to an 
argument against the thesis. If there is indeed a qualitative difference between evil and wrong, 
then theorists who conceive of evil as involving, say, only the harm element are mistaken – in 
other words, their theories are inadequate. “[T]he particulars of one’s theories of wrong and 
evil” do not conclusively decide the validity of the qualitative thesis, contrary to Formosa’s 
claim (ibid.). One still has to offer a separate argument against it in order to support one’s 
quantitative conception of evil. Perhaps, his second reason is meant to serve as an argument 
against the qualitative thesis. Even so, it does not seem persuasive. For if there is a possibility 
that using ‘very wrong’ could be offensive to the victims of evil, this seems to be a hint that 
‘very wrong’ and ‘evil’ are not always equivalent. It is important to note that my contention is 
not that evil is qualitatively distinct from (very) wrong in all cases. I have already mentioned 
that there are a few senses of evil in ordinary usage. The weak sense of evil seems effectively 
interchangeable with ‘wrong’ or ‘very wrong’ and I have no quarrel with that. My contention, 
rather, is that there is a certain usage of evil – namely, the strong sense of evil – that seems to 
support the qualitative thesis. If the equivalence thesis – i.e. evil and (very) wrong are 
synonymous in all cases – is true, then one would not have to worry that the use of ‘very 
wrong’ may be disrespectful in some cases, since it is supposed to be equivalent to ‘evil.’ But 
if using it could be disrespectful in one situation but not in another, then it is reasonable to 
find out whether there is also another sense that is commonly used, rather than dismissing it 
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as a matter of taste or practice. For instance, it does not seem problematic to describe David 
as bold or courageous when he takes on Goliath’s challenge; ‘bold’ and ‘courageous’ in this 
context are synonymous.1  But describing a delinquent boy who spitefully challenges the 
authority of his teacher as bold may not be equivalent to saying he is courageous. For ‘bold’ 
also has a derogatory sense of ‘without shame’ or ‘disrespectful,’ which cannot be used 
interchangeably with ‘courageous’; for ‘courageous’ seems to connote only honor or nobility 
in ordinary language. Given its additional derogatory sense, ‘bold’ would seem to capture the 
student’s spiteful behavior better or more accurately than ‘courageous.’ Hence, the fact that 
one word can be substituted with another word without any loss of meaning in one context 
but not in another suggests that they are not absolutely equivalent in meaning. This argument, 
I think, supports the qualitative thesis, which essentially states that ‘evil’ is not always readily 
interchangeable with ‘wrong’ or ‘very wrong.’ Whenever this is the case, we then have an 
instance of the strong sense of evil. 
My point is this: the notion of wrongness is unable to capture the strong sense of evil. 
There appears to be some evidence for this. If evil is simply a ‘wrong-intensifier’ in the 
quantitative sense, it is reasonable to expect ‘very wrong’ to replace ‘evil’ and still retain the 
same meaning in all instances. But this does not seem to be the case. For there are some cases 
in which ‘wrong’ or ‘very wrong’ cannot substitute ‘evil’ without resulting in some loss of 
meaning. The Holocaust is one clear example. It seems that however many ‘verys’ one adds 
to the term ‘wrong’ to describe the Holocaust, it still falls short of the specific meaning 
conveyed by the term ‘evil,’ which is apparently the one appropriate here (Haybron, 2002, p. 
260). And the reason for this is probably that the Holocaust – and for that matter, whatever is 
popularly regarded as evil – has at least an additional quality not found in common wrongs. 
This may explain why evil is not effectively synonymous and readily interchangeable with 
(very, very…) wrong (ibid.). If so, there is certainly a case for the qualitative thesis. 
1.3 Aim and Approach of Thesis 
                                                            
1 The story of David and Goliath can be found in I Samuel 17 (New American Standard Bible). 
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Like most other theorists of evil, I hope to make a contribution to the enterprise of 
broadening and deepening our understanding of evil as a significant moral category that is not 
just quantitatively but also qualitatively distinct from wrongness. In particular, I hope to shed 
light on the nature of evil actions – what makes human acts or actions evil – and not why 
people act evilly. To unpack the meaning of evil actions based on the strong sense of evil, evil 
actions are particularly horrifying and sinister actions that go beyond the pale of ordinary 
wrongdoing; they draw the strongest moral condemnation and evoke an extraordinary 
revulsion; they are also gross moral enormities that most people would normally find hard to 
forgive. Thus understood, evil actions are the worst sort of actions in moral terms. But I do 
not mean it in a strict superlative sense: on a moral continuum, evil actions mark out a 
region – and not a point – towards the negative end. In other words, on my view, evil admits 
of degrees. In keeping with the qualitative nature of evil, this so-called ‘evil’ region on the 
moral continuum is characterized by certain additional qualities that are absent in the ‘wrong’ 
region. 
Given the above analysis of the concept of evil, the aim of my thesis is to give a plausible 
and complete account of evil actions commensurable with the strong sense of evil. To achieve 
my aim, I will explore some of the recent theories of evil actions for insights and at the same 
time critically assess their arguments. My conclusion is that these theories are deficient in 
some important aspects. This then makes way for my formulation of a better alternate theory. 
In fact, the alternate theory is partly the result of developing and incorporating salient 
plausible points drawn from some of these theories. Most importantly, it seeks to overcome or 
avoid their shortcomings. For my purposes, I have selected six contemporary theories with 
different approaches and diverse views in conceiving of evil actions. They are theories 
offered by Kekes (1990), Card (2005, 2010), Garcia (2002), Steiner (2002), Formosa (2008) 
and de Wijze (2002), whom I have cited as some of the emerging theorists of evil at the 
beginning of this chapter. Yet, one must bear in mind that these six theories do not exhaust all 
the approaches and views found in the current literature on evil actions. For one thing, it is 
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impossible to examine every sort of theory of evil actions there is within the bounds of my 
thesis. I think six theories are just about the limit that can reasonably be accommodated in this 
thesis and still be sufficient for a fruitful analysis. But why these theories in particular? 
Admittedly, there is a certain degree of arbitrariness in the selection. They are selected mainly 
because they offer an interesting mix of different views and are representative of theories 
taking one of the three approaches that will be discussed in this thesis. The three approaches 
referred to here are perpetrator, victim and combination. In the moral appraisal of evil actions, 
the victim approach considers only the consequences for the victims, in particular the harm 
suffered by them; the perpetrator approach considers only factors concerning the perpetrator 
(e.g. motive and affect); and the combination approach considers factors pertaining to the 
perpetrator and victim (Formosa, 2007, p. 58). Among these six theories, Kekes and Card use 
the victim approach; Garcia and Steiner the perpetrator approach; and Formosa and de Wijze 
the combination approach. 
1.4 Criteria for a Robust Theory of Evil Actions 
In my opinion, there are at least three features that make a balanced, plausible and useful 
theory of evil actions – or, in short, a robust theory of evil actions. Naturally, they also form 
the criteria by which I assess the six theories. First, a theory of evil actions should take the 
combination approach, for this approach yields a more comprehensive or balanced view of 
evil by considering the perspectives of both the perpetrator and the victim; a single-
perspective approach is rather limited – or so I shall argue. I shall refer to this condition as the 
condition of balance. Second, it should find resonance with common intuitions, since evil is 
chiefly an intuitive notion (which I will elaborate later). I shall call this the condition of 
intuitive plausibility. Third, its criteria for evil actions should be clear and precise, so that one 
can identify them in a definite and consistent manner. In other words, there must be a 
reasonably clear and distinct boundary between evil and wrong actions. Naturally, if the 
boundary between them is well defined, it will be easy for us to distinguish one from the other. 
I shall refer to this condition as the condition of usefulness. That said, it is important to note 
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that a theory can still be useful even though it allows vague boundaries between evil and 
wrong in hard cases. I think the usefulness of a theory should not be discounted on the basis 
of its difficulties with some hard cases, because our moral judgments in such cases tend to be 
formed under conditions in which our moral capacities are most susceptible to distortion 
(Rawls, 1999, p. 42). In other words, our moral judgments made in regard to hard cases are 
likely to be erroneous or biased because they are not made under favorable conditions (ibid.). 
Hence, it is not reasonable to rely on hard cases to decide whether a theory is useful. This 
condition of usefulness actually has a pragmatic agenda: as evil actions tend to result in more 
serious physical and psychological harms than ordinary wrongs, it is imperative that we can 
easily and correctly identify them in order to facilitate immediate reparation or prevention 
measures. Evidently, a theory of evil actions that has the theoretical resources to support a 
strong qualitative thesis must also, to a large extent, be a useful theory. 
1.5 Preview of Proposed Theory 
The theory I am defending in this thesis is one that adopts the combination approach and 
is compatible with the qualitative thesis. Evil actions, on my view, are immoral actions that 
essentially reflect a flagrant disrespect or disregard for the human worth and life of another 
person. They are motivated by deplorable motives to dehumanize or kill another, or in which 
dehumanizing harm or death is foreseeable, performed in a state of monstrous affect, and 
resulting in dehumanizing harm or death. But there is an exception: when the actions are 
motivated by monstrous motives (e.g. malevolence) as opposed to relatively ordinary ones 
(e.g. greed), they are considered evil even though no harm ensues. In other words, harm is not 
a necessary condition only in the presence of monstrous motive and affect, which seem to 
carry sufficient weight to render an action evil. I will elaborate further and offer a detailed 
account of my theory in Chapter 5. 
1.6 Intuitions and Reflective Equilibrium 
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Like most theories of evil, my conception of evil actions relies significantly on intuitions 
or moral sensibilities. Undoubtedly, this will generate some worry about its credibility. Some, 
like Formosa (2008), hold that intuitions are often malleable and vague, and they vary 
according to culture, period and individuals (Formosa, 2008, p. 219). Yet, it would be going 
too far to ignore them totally in one’s formulation of a theory of evil – or any moral theory, 
for that matter. John Rawls notes that it is “obviously impossible to develop a substantive 
theory of justice founded solely on truths of logic and definition” (1999, p. 44). I think what 
he says can also be applied to theories of evil. Without consulting our moral sensibilities, 
there will be nothing substantial with which we can begin to set out moral principles. It may 
be true that our intuitions are malleable, but they can be rendered relatively stable on the 
whole. How? By excluding “judgments made with hesitation,” little confidence, or under 
unfavorable conditions, since they are likely to be erroneous and biased, and by including 
only judgments made under favorable conditions (Rawls, 1999, p. 42). Such a stabilized state 
of moral sensibilities is referred to as considered judgments or moral sensibilities (ibid.; de 
Wijze, 2002, note 22). Therefore, it is not entirely true that our intuitions are volatile as to be 
largely unreliable. The fact is, “[w]e have a sense of morality and justice long before we can 
offer rational justifications based on carefully crafted principles” (de Wijze, 2002, p. 215). 
One need not be trained in logic or rational principles in order to make plausible everyday 
moral judgments. The question, therefore, is not whether we should rely on our intuitions at 
all, but rather, how much weight we should give to our intuitions, in formulating or revising 
moral theories. The answer, I think, is to strike a balance between intuitions and theoretical 
conditions, which is Rawls’ principle of reflective equilibrium (1999, pp. 42-43). Briefly, it is 
a process of refining theoretical principles to accord with our moral convictions and adjusting 
our moral convictions to accord with theoretical principles until a state of balance or reflective 
equilibrium is reached between them. 
I find the method of reflective equilibrium useful and suitable for the subject matter of my 
thesis. After all, the concept of evil has its home in ordinary moral discourse (Haybron, 2002, 
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p. 261). This implies that evil is not just “a theoretical notion in ethics”; it is first and 
foremost an ordinary notion that has an independent meaning outside the theoretical 
framework (ibid.). This then makes intuitive plausibility an important check on any theory of 
evil. In other words, a theory of evil should, as far as possible, reflect and not offend our 
moral sensibilities. That said, I do not imply that a theory of evil must fit our moral 
sensibilities exactly in order to be plausible. For admittedly, they may at times be subject to 
inconsistency and distortion due to prejudice, ignorance or other unfavorable conditions. 
Moreover, it is unrealistic to expect ourselves to be always impartial or sufficiently informed 
in every situation. Hence, in order to ensure consistency in our moral judgments, there is a 
place for us to adjust our intuitive understanding of evil to match the theoretical conditions of 
evil. If we aim to gain an accurate and deeper understanding of evil actions, we would have to 
strike a balance between our deeply held moral convictions and theoretical conditions. 
One way for a theory of evil actions to achieve reflective equilibrium is, I think, for it to 
fulfill the three proposed conditions for a robust theory of evil actions. The condition of 
balance ensures that we make a fair and holistic assessment by considering both victim and 
perpetrator factors on equal terms. The condition of intuitive plausibility ensures that the 
theory coheres with – and not violate – convictions about evil that are well-entrenched in 
common moral consciousness. The condition of usefulness ensures that the theory has a 
distinct function from theories of wrongdoing; our concern here is to effectively identify and 
distinguish evil actions from other kinds of wrongdoing. 
1.7 Relevance of Theory of Evil Actions 
Yet, one may question the relevance of a theory of evil actions. Why should we care 
about whether an action is evil? Are not theories of the right and the good, and theories of 
wrongdoing sufficient to help us understand the right way to behave? First, I think the term 
‘evil’ has a legitimate place in our moral vocabulary, for it captures certain aspect of our 
moral reality which other terms of negative moral appraisal do not seem able to capture. If so, 
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a theory of evil actions that makes explicit our implicit assumptions about evil will certainly 
enrich our moral understanding. Second, it is true that theories of the right and the good, and 
theories of wrongdoing help us grasp the right way to act, but a theory of evil actions casts 
light on a different aspect of morality altogether – namely, the worst sort of human behavior. I 
think it will be beneficial for those of us who care about morality to know what constitute evil 
actions, in addition to knowing what is right and wrong. For evil actions, being the worst sort 
of actions, necessarily top the list of morally forbidden actions. If nothing else, they are the 
first actions we should avoid doing in all circumstances, as they tend to lead to grave 
consequences. Third, in our endeavor to be moral, theories of evil actions may prove to be 
more practicable than theories of ideal behavior, as it is usually easier never to act in a certain 
way than to act ideally (Anderson, 1990, p. 43). Given our moral imperfections, it is 
understandably difficult, if not impossible, to adhere to high moral standards. Hence, it will 
be no surprise if we never attain the ideal in our lifetime despite trying very hard. But it seems 
attainable not to commit a single act of evil action throughout our life if we are aware of what 
makes actions evil and be mindful of our motive and behavior. Fourth, from a practical point 
of view, since evil actions tend to result in enormously grave consequences, it will be 
advantageous to have a set of theoretical tools to identify them, so as to facilitate the setting 
of priorities “when resources are limited for preventing wrongs and repairing harms” (Card, 
2010, p. 7). 
In light of the above reasons, there is certainly a place for theories of evil actions in the 
moral enterprise. Given the legitimacy of such theories, the question now is: what makes a 
robust account of evil actions? This is essentially the question that my thesis aims to answer 
in order to help us understand evil actions better. The following is a structural overview of my 
attempt to tackle the question: the analysis of the six current theories of evil actions will 
occupy the next three chapters. Chapter 2 deals with the victim approach, Chapter 3 the 
perpetrator approach and Chapter 4 the combination approach; the alternate theory will be 
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expounded in Chapter 5; and Chapter 6 will be the conclusion to the whole thesis. Let us now 





















2 The Victim Approach 
In this chapter, we will examine two theories of evil actions offered by Kekes (1990) and 
Card (2005, 2010) respectively. Essentially, Kekes derives the evilness of an action from its 
resulting undeserved harm while Card draws on the features of atrocities to sketch out an 
account of evil actions.2 The harm or victim factor thus constitutes the focus of their theories. 
There are two tasks that I seek to accomplish here as well as in the subsequent two chapters: 
(1) to glean for insights provided by the theories to enrich our understanding of evil actions; 
(2) to assess the theories based on the three criteria for a robust theory of evil actions, as 
proposed in Chapter 1 – i.e. balance, intuitive plausibility and usefulness. In each section, I 
will present a summary of the theory under analysis before proceeding to the discussion. 
2.1 Kekes: Evil Action As Infliction of Undeserved Harm 
On Kekes’ theory, evil in its primary sense refers to “undeserved harm inflicted on human 
beings” (1990, p. 4). Actions, character traits, customs, laws, and ceremonies may be “evil in 
a derivative way” (ibid.). Kekes explains thus: 
[The] primary sense “evil” refers to the undeserved harm human beings cause one 
another and themselves. And since such harm is caused by the actions of human agents, 
the subjects of which “evil” in its first derivation sense is predicated are human actions. 
(1990, p. 48) 
In other words, actions derive their evil property from the perpetrators’ infliction of 
undeserved harm against other persons or themselves. Kekes clarifies that the harm relevant 
to his account is what he calls “simple harm,” as opposed to “complex harm” (1990, p. 53).3 
By simple harm he means the deprivation of the minimum requirements of human welfare 
                                                            
2  Kekes, in his book The Roots of Evil (2005), has modified his theory to include a perpetrator 
component – more precisely, the malevolent motivation of evildoers. But for the sake of argument, I 
will use his earlier harm-based conception of evil actions as an example of a victim-centered account. 
3 Complex harm has to do with “particular conceptions of good lives,” which are contingent on period, 
culture and individuals, and require the minimum requirements of human welfare (Kekes, 1990, p. 53). 
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(1990, p. 51). These requirements, he maintains, are “universally human, culturally invariant, 
and historically constant features of human life” (ibid.). He identifies three aspects to these 
requirements: physiological, psychological and social. The first refers to our basic needs such 
as food, water, air and shelter (ibid.); the second refers to our “psychological aspiration to go 
beyond necessity and enjoy the luxury of satisfying our needs” in ways that seem desirable to 
us – more precisely, we want to have “the opportunity to direct [our] lives, assess what [we] 
regard as important, develop [our] capacities, and do what [we] can to make good lives for 
[ourselves]” (1990, p. 53); the third refers to those features of society (e.g. security, freedom, 
established institutions and rules etc.) that make it possible for us to satisfy our physiological 
and psychological needs, “create and protect conditions in which we can exercise our 
capacities, and establish and maintain close relationships” (1990, p. 52). According to Kekes, 
“what makes simple harm into simple evil is that it is undeserved, and it is undeserved unless 
there is an acceptable moral reason for thinking otherwise” (1990, p. 56). Hence, evil as 
undeserved harm is a succinct way of saying that the simple harm inflicted on another is 
without moral justification (1990, p. 59). 
Kekes’ definition of evil actions as the infliction of undeserved simple harm on another or 
oneself is convincing to some extent. It is convincing because it seems to me that Kekes’ 
conception of simple harm is appropriate and sufficiently distinctive for evil actions. 
Depriving others of their requirement for basic welfare is serious in that it directly jeopardizes 
their health and lives. Ordinary wrongs (e.g. stealing, breach of trust), on the other hand, 
usually result in less serious harm. The victim approach has two notable virtues: (1) it is able 
to accommodate many different motives – whether normal or abnormal – for committing evil, 
since causing undeserved harm is sufficient for the ascription of evil; (2) it is able to prevent 
trivial or negligible harms (e.g. light bruises, mild insult) from being considered evil 
(Formosa, 2008, p. 221). Unfortunately, by focusing on harm and failing to consider the 
perpetrator’s psychology in a judgment of evil, Kekes’ account – or for that matter, victim-
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centered accounts in general – lacks comprehensiveness and is susceptible to counterintuitive 
results in some straightforward cases. 
First, it seems that not all cases of causing undeserved severe harm can plausibly count as 
evil. For instance, X is anxious to reach home in time to catch the last episode of her favorite 
soap opera. As she is driving, she notices that the traffic lights some distance ahead have just 
changed to amber and decides to beat the red light, estimating that she would be able to cross 
the junction safely by speeding up. At the same time, Y is driving at cruising speed some 
distance from another side of the same junction at which the traffic lights have just changed in 
his favor and is about to cross the junction when he notices X’s car. In order to avoid a 
collision, Y swerves his car to one side, loses control and crashes into a lamppost. Y dies 
instantly on the spot and his passengers are seriously injured. Applying Kekes’ theory to this 
case would render X’s action evil, for she has caused undeserved harm to others, which is all 
that matters in the assessment of evil actions on Kekes’ view. Yet, although X’s desire to 
catch her soap opera does not justify her reckless driving, calling her action evil seems 
inappropriate. For one thing, she does not have any motive or intention to cause undeserved 
harm to others. Unfortunately, Kekes’ harm-based account is unable to avert such implausible 
result. Given that Y and his family do not deserve the harm, X’s reckless action must come 
out evil – whether or not X has the motive or intention to cause undeserved harm – since, 
based on Kekes’ theory, the evilness of an action is derived simply from the undeserved 
simple harm it causes. 
Second, in light of the richness and complexity of the concept of evil, it is difficult to 
accept that grave harm is all that matters to evil actions. Consider a Nazi’s humiliating 
treatment of a religious Jew. Chaim Kaplan recounts an incident in which a rabbi was forced 
by a Nazi to spit on a Torah scroll; when the rabbi stopped spitting because he had no more 
saliva, the Nazi then spit into the rabbi’s mouth so that he could continue to spit on the Torah 
(1999, p. 87). Without question, Kekes’ theory is able to capture the evilness found in this 
case in terms of the harm done to the rabbi. Based on the psychological aspect of simple harm, 
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the Nazi’s action was mentally damaging to the rabbi as he was desecrating that which was 
highly sacred to the rabbi; the rabbi’s dignity both as a religious leader and a human being 
was also deeply violated. Yet, it seems that the evilness of this case consists in more than just 
the deep psychological trauma imposed on the rabbi. For instance, one can further identify the 
direct intention and vicious malice with which the Nazi performed the humiliating act as the 
relevant factors that contribute significantly to the vileness of the act. Given that these 
psychological factors are present, a theory of evil actions that is able to capture them is surely 
more illuminating and adequate than one of which the focus is just on the harm suffered by 
the victim. Insofar as Kekes’ victim-centered theory does not consider the perpetrator’s 
psychology as relevant to the assessment of evil actions, it is inadequate. 
Third, it will be difficult for Kekes’ theory to demarcate a qualitative boundary between 
evil and wrong actions so long as it considers harmful consequences as the only relevant evil-
making property. For instance, if inflicting undeserved mild injuries on another is considered 
wrong while inflicting severe ones evil, it seems that the difference between these two actions 
lies in the amount of harm: the latter inflicts greater harm than the former on the victim. There 
appears to be no additional quality that can distinguish the latter from the former, besides the 
severity of harm. Hence, Kekes’ victim-centered account seems incompatible with the 
qualitative thesis. 
To sum up this section, I have noted that Kekes’s account of undeserved simple harm is 
appropriate for evil, for it is morally grave and distinct from the less serious harm imposed by 
wrongdoings, in that evil actions are actions that directly jeopardize the basic welfare of the 
victims. However, by adopting the victim approach to conceive of evil actions, Kekes appears 
to ignore the perpetrator’s psychology, which, as shown in the reckless driver and Nazi 
examples, is relevant to whether an action is evil. In that regard, Kekes’ account is not 
illuminating. Moreover, given the rich concept of evil, it does not seem credible that the 
evilness of actions lies solely in the severity of harm suffered by the victims. In addition, its 
focus on severity of harm makes it unable to distinguish evil actions qualitatively from wrong 
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ones. As should be obvious, Kekes’ theory does not fully meet the criteria of a robust theory 
of evil actions: (1) it fails to take a balanced approach because it is biased towards the victim; 
(2) it can produce counterintuitive results in some straightforward cases; (3) its usefulness is 
limited in that it does not capture evil-making psychological properties and cannot support the 
qualitative thesis. 
2.2 Card: The Atrocity Paradigm 
Card calls her theory “the atrocity paradigm (or atrocity theory) because atrocities are my 
paradigms of evil” (2010, p. 6). Her list of atrocities includes the Holocaust, carpet-bombings 
in World War II, Stalin’s gulags, the killing fields of Cambodia, and mass rape in war (ibid.; 
2010, p. xi). It also includes low-profile atrocities such as domestic violence and prison rape, 
as she realizes that evils need not be extraordinary, but can be commonplace too (2010, pp. xi, 
6). According to her, atrocities are useful as paradigms of evils for (1) they are 
“uncontroversially evil,” (2) “the core features of evils tend to be writ large” in such cases 
(thus facilitating easy identification and appreciation of evil) and (3) they “deserve priority of 
attention” in view of the limited resources for preventing and repairing wrongs, as evils are 
more urgent because “life and basic quality of life are at stake” (2002, p. 9; 2010, pp. 6-7). 
Natural calamites such as hurricanes, floods and earthquakes, though devastatingly harmful, 
are not considered atrocities when they do not result from culpable wrongs (2010, p. 6). 
However, she qualifies that “not all evils are atrocities”: murder is an evil in the absence of a 
moral excuse, yet “not every murder is an atrocity” (ibid.). The atrocity paradigm, she adds, 
“encourages a focus first on suffering,” for harm is the most salient feature about atrocities 
(2005, p. 9). 
Card’s theory is thus one which relies on the “the nature and severity of harms, rather 
than perpetrators' psychological states,” to differentiate between evils and lesser wrongs 
(2005, p. 3). By lesser wrongs she means actions that “do less serious harm” (2010, p. 9). She 
claims that “atrocities are recognizable without our knowing the perpetrators’ states of mind” 
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(2005, p. 9). In fact, she observes that “evils and lesser wrongs can be performed from the 
same motives (say, greed, impatience, or desires for approval)” (2010, p. 10). For instance, 
Eichmann’s motives for his monstrous deeds are apparently banal (e.g. obedience to authority 
and ambition) (ibid.). Hence, her theory does not define evil by motive, though she regards 
culpability relevant to a judgment of evil (2005, p. 9). Culpability is captured in the agency 
component on her theory (see next paragraph). In addition, she holds that the atrocity theory 
makes no presumption about the innocence of victims; rather, it presumes that “no one should 
have to suffer atrocities, regardless of individual character or deserts” (2005, p. 13). 
Understanding atrocities as both perpetrated and suffered gives Card the two basic 
elements of her theory: culpable wrongdoing (or agency) and intolerable harm (2005, pp. 4, 9; 
2010, p. 5). By ‘intolerable harm’ she means the deprivation of “basics ordinarily needed to 
make a life (or a death) decent” (2010, p. 8). Examples of such harm are “lack of access to 
non-toxic food, water, or air; lack of freedom from prolonged and severe pain, humiliation, or 
debilitating fear; prolonged inability to move one’s limbs or to stand, sit or lie down; lack of 
affective bonds with others; …the inability to make choices and act on at least some of them 
effectively” (2005, p. 16; 2010, p. 8). For instance, “severe and unremitting pain or 
humiliation,” starvation, and enforced isolation are evils (2005, p. 16). She points out that 
‘intolerable’ on her theory is a normative concept, and that intolerable harm does not refer to 
what an individual cannot tolerate but “to what a decent life cannot include” (2005, p. 16; 
2010, p. 8). Hence, intolerable harm is not an entirely subjective matter on her view (2010, p. 
8). 
Culpable wrongdoing, as stressed by Card, is an action that lacks moral justification 
(2005, p. 18). It is later revised to ‘inexcusable wrongs’ to suggest that evils are wrongs that 
“remain unmitigated by any morally good reason” (2010, p. 17).4 Card considers this revision 
advantageous because, since culpability admits of degrees, ‘evil’ can be too heavy a judgment 
                                                            
4 Card proposes ‘culpable wrongdoing’ in The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil (2005) and later 
revises it to ‘inexcusable wrongs’ in Confronting Evil: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide (2010). 
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when a (good) moral excuse mitigates culpability to a high degree (ibid.). On her view, evils 
lack two kinds of excuses: metaphysical and moral (2010, p. 16). Metaphysical excuse pleads 
reduced or no responsibility; it is concerned with whether agency exists in a particular case. It 
is so named due to its focus on the ontology of agency (ibid.). Moral excuse refers to “some 
reason that counts morally in favour of the deed, even though, on balance, other 
considerations outweigh it” (2010, p. 13). In other words, this kind of excuse carries little 
moral weight or lacks sufficient justificatory force (2010, pp. 13, 20). It seeks to mitigate 
culpability without diminishing responsibility (2010, p. 16). It is so named due to its focus on 
the moral defensibility of a deed (2010, p. 17). Card offers the following examples to 
illustrate the two kinds of excuse. First, if I explain that my bumping into you is caused by the 
crowd, I am offering a metaphysical excuse (2010, p. 21). My reason suggests that the crowd 
is responsible for doing it to you, not I (ibid.). In other words, I am pleading for no agency. 
The other example is a midwife who is stopped by a police officer for speeding, and explains 
that she is on her way to deliver a baby (ibid.). Here, the midwife takes responsibility for the 
speeding but is pleading for mitigated culpability (ibid.). Her reason is considered a moral 
excuse if it is not strong enough to justify her action on the whole (ibid.). In that sense, Card 
notes, moral excuse is a sort of “partial justification” (ibid.). Hence, “[i]nexcusable wrongs 
are the ones that remain unmitigated by any morally good reason” (2010, p. 17). In other 
words, they lack both moral and metaphysical excuses (2010, p. 20). She admits that it may 
go too far to require evil deeds be without excuses at all, which implies that culpability is not 
mitigated to any degree (2010, p. 23). Hence, she makes refinement to her view: evil actions 
may have moral excuses that mitigate culpability to a certain extent, but these moral excuses 
are too paltry to avert judgments of evil (ibid.). 
Furthermore, she adds, that “the agent thinks that there is a good reason” for his action is 
not enough to justify his action; “[t]here must be one (and it must be the agent’s reason), a 
reason defensible on reflection and in terms of moral values” (2010, p. 17, italics original). 
Therefore, one cannot just take any means to achieve a good end; Card’s theory requires the 
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means be morally defensible too (ibid.). She cites a historical example: the Third Reich’s 
military incursion into neighbouring countries is apparently motivated by the desire to find 
Lebensraum (living space) for the German people (2010, p. 20). However, Card contends that 
the desire for Lebensraum is a reason that carries “no moral weight” for forcibly relocating, 
let alone slaughtering, the inhabitants of other nations; hence, the Nazi military campaign is 
morally inexcusable (2010, p. 21). 
According to Card, inexcusable wrongs are “frequently matters of succumbing to 
temptations, failing to think a thing through, failing to identify and examine assumptions 
critically, or caving in to peer pressure” (2010, p. 22). Admittedly, our vulnerabilities or 
weaknesses may sometimes excuse our misdeeds (2010, pp. 22-23). However, when serious 
harm is reasonably foreseeable, failing to think through our actions, or succumbing to 
temptations and peer pressures cannot serve as an excuse if “we are in good health, free from 
other pressing demands on our attention, and have time and opportunity” (2010, p. 23). 
Bringing the two basic elements and other relevant factors together under the revised 
theory, an evil, according to Card, is a reasonably foreseeable intolerable harm (which need 
not be highly probable) produced, seriously risked, sustained, aggravated, or tolerated by 
inexcusable wrongs (2005, p. 20; 2010, p. 16). By ‘reasonably foreseeable harm’ she means 
harm that can be foreseen when attended with reasonable care – this is meant to exclude 
“freak accidents” and include cases of “culpable recklessness, negligence, or even a choice to 
ignore” (2005, p. 20). 
On Card’s view, lesser wrongs differ from evils in that, in the case of the former, either 
there is no reasonably foreseeable intolerable harm, or the agent has a good moral reason for 
inflicting the harm (2010, p. 13). In other words, lesser wrongs are either inexcusable or result 
in intolerable harm, but not both. It is only in the case of evils that intolerable harm and the 
lack of moral excuse are found in conjunction (ibid.).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
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I find Card’s atrocity paradigm largely convincing. Indeed, in ordinary moral appraisal, 
atrocities committed without good moral excuses are often considered evil. If nothing else, 
atrocities such as the Holocaust and the Rape of Nanking are what most people would 
immediately invoke as clear examples of evil. In addition, she rightly points out that 
perpetrating atrocities as a means to an end – even a good end – requires moral justification; 
otherwise, it still counts as evil. Unfortunately, due to its focus on the harm perpetrated 
against the victims, Cards theory fails to give sufficient treatment to the perpetrator’s 
psychology which, as pointed out in my analysis of Kekes’ account earlier, is relevant to the 
moral assessment of evil actions. Additionally, like Kekes’ account, it does not seem able to 
distinguish evil from wrong actions qualitatively due to its focus on the severity of harm. In 
light of the above deficiencies, Card’s account is inadequate and not very useful. 
Moreover, certain parts of Card’s theory seem implausible and likely to produce 
counterintuitive results. According to her, when intolerable harm is reasonably foreseeable, 
failing to think through our actions cannot serve as a moral excuse if we are not under 
extreme circumstances such as poor health, pressing demands and lack of time and 
opportunity (2010, p. 23). Moreover, she does not require such foreseeable harm be highly 
probable (2005, p. 20). Athough these provisions allow her theory to hold culpable cases of 
negligence and recklessness as evil, they also, unfortunately, make her theory susceptible to 
clearly implausible outcomes. Consider this example: a cab driver is chatting with his 
passenger while driving, and being deep in conversation, the cab driver becomes distracted 
while making a turn and collides with a motorcyclist. Consequently, the motorcyclist sustains 
serious injuries and suffers excruciating pain for an extended period of time. Recall that, on 
Card’s theory, evil actions have two elements: intolerable harm and inexcusable wrongdoing 
(2010, p. 13). Now, the motorcyclist’s suffering seems to fit a description of Card’s 
intolerable harm: a violation of “the freedom from prolonged and severe pain” (2010, p. 6). 
Hence, the condition of intolerable harm appears to obtain. Additionally, the cab driver does 
not seem to have a good moral excuse: such intolerable harm would have been reasonably 
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foreseeable if he were to attend with reasonable care; furthermore, he is not under extreme 
circumstances that make him unable to exercise care. Put differently, the cab driver owes a 
duty of care to the motorcyclist, which he fails to fulfil in this case.5 Hence, the condition of 
inexcusable wrongdoing also seems to obtain. Given the presence of the two necessary 
conditions for evil, the cab driver’s action must come out evil on Card’s theory. Yet, this 
judgment is problematic. No doubt this is a case of culpable negligence that results in 
intolerable harm, but most people would be hard pressed to condemn it as evil. For the 
judgment of evil seems too heavy for such negligence where an outright motive or intention 
to harm others is absent. Hence, applying Card’s theory to such a case is likely to yield a 
counterintuitive outcome. 
If the above analysis is correct, it will undermine the plausibility of Card’s conception of 
evil actions. For it seems that not all actions possessing the elements of intolerable harm and 
inexcusable wrongdoing amount to evil, as shown in the cab driver example. This analysis 
result suggests that characterizing evil actions based on the severity of harm and lack of a 
moral excuse is still insufficient, because it cannot delineate a firm distinction between evil 
and wrong actions. Hence, we need to identify additional evil-making factors that may 
explain why we are inclined to consider the negligent action of the cab driver wrong but the 
psychologically damaging action of the Nazi evil (as cited in previous section), even though 
both actions involve intolerable harm and lack moral excuses. These additional factors, it 
seems, are to be found in the perpetrator’s psychology. 
In addition, I think Card is right to hold that the same motives can drive the commission 
of lesser wrongs and evils (2010, p. 10). For instance, one can be motivated by greed to rob a 
bank without hurting anyone, or slaughter a village of people just to steal their wealth. I also 
agree with her that “atrocities are recognizable without our knowing the perpetrators’ states of 
mind” (2005, p. 9). Even so, I think there is still a place for identifying abhorrent motives as 
evil-making properties. In cases where intolerable harm does not ensue, it still seems 
                                                            
5 I owe this point to Dr. Kyle Swan, my thesis supervisor. 
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plausible to render the strongest moral condemnation to actions in which sinister motives are 
present. For instance, an agent who plants a bomb at a kindergarten just to vent his 
frustrations against the society is still acting evilly even though the bomb fails to detonate due 
to some unexpected technical glitch. Here, the agent’s nefarious motive seems substantial 
enough to render his action evil although no one is harmed. I will argue further in Chapter 5. 
In this section, I have noted that Card’s atrocity paradigm easily finds resonance with 
common intuitions, as many atrocities are widely held to be indisputably evil. Her account of 
intolerable harm also seems distinctive enough to demarcate a clear boundary between evil 
and lesser wrongs, though it does not seem able to accommodate the qualitative thesis. I have 
noted that her account encounters several problems. First, by focusing on the victim, her 
theory suffers the same shortcomings as Kekes’ in that it is unable to capture adequately the 
evilness of evil actions, since our sense of evil also seems to be evoked by psychological 
factors such as intention and motive. Notably, certain cases of negligence where the agent 
lacks the motive or direct intention to inflict intolerable harm do not seem evil. Second, given 
that not all cases of inexcusable infliction of intolerable harm amount to evil, as shown in the 
cab driver example, Card’s conception of evil actions may not be adequate; evil actions seem 
to consist in more than just the harm element – perhaps, the perpetrator’s psychology is 
equally important. Third, I have argued that there is a place for identifying abhorrent motives 
as relevant to a judgment of evil, so as to provide further insight into evil actions. In light of 
the above problems, it is clear that Card’s theory fails to satisfy fully the conditions for a 
robust theory of evil actions: (1) being victim-centered, it fails to take a balanced approach; (2) 
her theory is liable to produce counterintuitive results in some uncontroversial cases; (3) its 
usefulness is limited as it fails to capture adequately the psychological factors of evildoers 
and support the qualitative thesis. 
To sum up this chapter, in my investigation of two theories of evil actions that use 
predominantly the victim approach, it is clear that they are inadequate. For the perpetrator’s 
psychology seems equally important and relevant to a judgment of evil. Moreover, their focus 
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on severity of harm also makes them incompatible with the qualitative thesis, for less serious 
harms are only quantitatively different from more serious harm. Nonetheless, I think the harm 
element is crucial to our sense of evil. In the next chapter, I will examine two theories of evil 
actions that take the perpetrator approach. We shall see whether evil actions can be more 



















3 The Perpetrator Approach 
In the last chapter, I have examined two victim-centered theories of evil actions offered 
by Kekes and Card, and concluded that they are not sufficiently robust. Their biggest flaw is 
underestimating the importance of perpetrator factors. In this chapter, my focus is on theories 
of evil actions that take the perpetrator approach. I shall find out whether such theories – in 
particular, the ones proposed by Garcia (2002) and Steiner (2002) respectively – are more 
adequate than those that take the victim approach. Garcia’s conception of evil actions is 
essentially based on Kantian concepts of an agent’s will, which he modifies to accommodate 
our basic intuitions about evil actions. Steiner, on the other hand, construes evil as 
fundamentally an affective quality that aggravates the wrongness of actions.  
3.1 Garcia: A Kantian Theory of Evil  
In his paper, Garcia seeks to formulate a Kantian theory of “evil as dehumanization” 
which features certain elements from Kant’s notion of moral and immoral actions (2002, p. 
194). At the same time, he aims to draw a qualitative distinction between evil and ordinary 
immoral action based on the Kantian “structure of the agent’s will” (ibid., italics original). To 
understand Garcia’s theory, it is important to grasp what he means by material object of an 
agent’s will and form of an agent’s maxim. 
On his theory, Garcia refers to the “concrete state of affairs” – which is the object of the 
agent’s maxim – as the material object of his will (2002, pp. 194, 196). For instance, if I will 
the violation of another’s humanity as the object of my maxim, then the violation of another’s 
humanity is the material object of my will. In the Kantian framework, the material object 
involved in moral action is always humanity itself and some concrete state of affairs – namely, 
“perfect justice in which human happiness exists in exact proportion to virtue” and “our own 
moral perfection” (2002, p. 197). The object involved in immoral action, however, is always 
“some specific state of affairs, where the humanity of another person figures indirectly into 
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our action as a useful incidental means towards the realization of [our goal]” (2002, p. 201, 
italics original). 
On Garcia’s view, the form of one’s maxim has to do with the “principle of willing,” 
which, on Kant’s view, solely determines “the moral worth of an action” (2002, p. 196). In 
the Kantian framework, the maxim involved in moral action takes the form of always acting 
harmoniously with, and never against, the humanity in each person (ibid.). Immoral action, on 
the other hand, consists in wrongly setting up a relative practical principle, through self-
conceit, as an unconditional practical principle – “as if it were a genuine categorical 
imperative” (2002, p. 200). 
Evil action in Kantianism, Garcia informs, is one in which the principle of morality (an 
unconditional practical principle) is subordinated to the principle of self-love (a relative 
practical principle) through “a direct act of the agent’s will” (2002, p. 195). Hence, it seems to 
him that a strict Kantian theory does not permit a conception of evil that is distinct from 
immoral actions (ibid.). For both immoral and evil actions seem to consist just in wrongful 
attempts to subordinate the principle of morality to the principle of self-love. 
On Garcia’s theory, “evil actions represent a sort of morally corrupt hybrid between 
Kantian moral and immoral action” (2002, p. 201). They share material similarity with 
Kantian moral actions in that humanity is treated as an end in itself – but instead of respecting 
the humanity in another person (as in Kantian moral actions), they directly violate the 
humanity of another person qua human (ibid.). Furthermore, they share formal similarity with 
Kantian immoral actions in that the agent “wrongly subordinates the principle of morality to 
the principle of self-love” (ibid.). Nevertheless, a qualitative difference exists between evil 
and immoral actions, which is to be found in their material objects. In the former, the direct 
violation of the humanity of another person itself constitutes the object of the agent’s willing; 
in the latter, using the humanity of another person merely as a means to realize “some further 
state of affairs” is the object of his willing (ibid.). To illustrate immoral action, Garcia cites an 
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example of an agent making a false promise to another in order to procure ready money 
(ibid.). Here, the other person only figures as a useful means to achieve a further state of 
affairs – which, in this case, is the procurement of ready money. Evil action, on the other hand, 
is one in which the humanity of another person is violated as an end in itself (ibid.). It is 
important to note that, on Garcia’s theory, using a person as a means does not amount to evil. 
According to him, what distinguishes immoral action from evil action qualitatively is that the 
former uses or violates the humanity of another person as a means while the latter violates the 
humanity of another person as an end in itself (ibid.). He proposes the latter to be the 
characterization of “evil as dehumanization” (ibid.).  
To illustrate the nature of dehumanization, Garcia identifies four paradigmatic cases, 
which, he believes, “capture many of our basic intuitions about genuinely evil action”; but he 
concedes that he has not exhausted all possibilities (2002, p. 202). The four paradigms are as 
follows: 
(a) [I]ndifference to the destruction of the humanity of another person; (b) denial of the 
humanity of another person; (c) servility, or depreciation of one’s own humanity; and (d) 
delight in suffering of the humanity of another person. (ibid.) 
Garcia cites the example of Adolf Eichmann to illustrate the first type of evil, which 
entails attaching zero value to humanity (2002, p. 204). According to him, Eichmann’s action 
is evil because, in the midst of dutifully carrying out the orders of his superiors, he remained 
indifferent and unaffected by the destruction of his victims’ humanity (2002, p. 202). It is 
reported that, during his trial, he told the court that he not only followed orders but also 
obeyed the law, thereby commending himself to be a good Kantian (ibid.). However, Garcia 
finds Eichmann’s behavior specially disturbing, for he prized obedience to the law over “the 
absolute value” of humanity, and showed no feelings towards the humanity of the persons 
whom he destroyed (ibid.). According to Garcia, humanity is given no value in such cases of 
indifference (2002, p. 204). The second kind of evil is exemplified by racist behavior, in that 
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the racist believes sincerely, or through willful self-deception, that “members of a different 
race count as less than human” (2002, p. 203). Such an attitude, in his opinion, is what is truly 
evil and “not so much the particular acts of taunting, racial slurs, or displays of disrespect” 
(2002, pp. 202-203). In this instance, the racist attaches a positive value to humanity but 
denies humanity to certain racial groups (2002, p. 205). According to Garcia, the third and 
fourth kinds of evil are direct opposites of each other. Servility is an instance of the third kind: 
it involves the disavowing of one’s humanity in order to grant the pleasure or seek the favor 
of another person (2002, p. 204). Here, one attaches a negative value to one’s humanity but a 
positive one to another’s (2002, p. 205). Unfortunately, Garcia gives no further illustration 
other than citing servility as an example. But it seems applicable to slavery: if I am a slave 
who willingly serves the whims of my master at the expense of disavowing my humanity, 
then my action is evil by Garcia’s standards. The fourth kind is instantiated by “delighting in 
the suffering of others” (e.g. torture), which involves privileging one’s own pleasure by 
denying dignity to another (2002, p. 203). Here is a case of giving a positive value to one’s 
own humanity but a negative one to another’s (2002, p. 205). Garcia holds that all four cases 
involve a direct violation of humanity (2002, p. 202). In his opinion, an evil action can be 
viewed as “a fundamental privation of our humanity” and also as a transgression against the 
absolute worth of a human being, which is established a priori by human reason (2002, p. 
207). 
I think Garcia has led us in the right direction by construing evil as dehumanization, 
which seems to resonate deeply with common intuitions. I agree with him that evil actions 
have to do with privation of humanity and violating the absolute worth of another human 
being. I think they are closely linked to our sense of evil. This may explain why, for instance, 
(unjustified) mass murders and vicious forms of humiliation tend to strike many as evil, 
probably because they reflect an outright disrespect for the intrinsic worth of other persons.6 
Taking the perpetrator approach, Garcia also identifies a relevant factor for evil: the structure 
                                                            
6 My theory advances a similar view, though it is not based on Kantian concepts. See Chapter 5. 
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of the agent’s will. It is clearly evil for an agent to will, as the object of his maxim, the 
violation of another’s humanity as an end in itself. 
Yet, Garcia’s theory encounters several difficulties. First, his four paradigms of 
dehumanization do not seem to be convincing examples of direct violation of another’s or 
one’s humanity; rather, they seem to depict violation of another’s or one’s humanity as a 
means.7 In the first paradigm, Eichmann’s indifference to the destruction of the Jews does not 
seem to be clearly an end in itself; rather, it seems to be a means to obeying orders, pleasing 
his superiors or securing a promotion. In other words, he is not being indifferent to the 
humanity of the Jews just for the sake of being indifferent to it. In the second paradigm, the 
racist’s denial of the humanity of persons from other ethnic groups can be a means to 
affirming his superiority, which underlies his racist beliefs. He is not, strictly speaking, 
denying another’s humanity for the sake of denying it. In the third paradigm, the depreciation 
of one’s humanity appears to be a means to fulfilling the pleasure or gaining the favor of 
another; one is not depreciating one’s humanity purely for the sake of depreciating it. In the 
fourth paradigm, one’s denial of another’s dignity seems to be a means to bringing delight to 
oneself, since one delights in seeing others suffer. Hence, one is not making others suffer 
solely for its own sake. In contrast, a direct violation of humanity is a violation of humanity 
simpliciter – there is no other purpose, goal or further state of affairs to be realized. In other 
words, dehumanization as an end in itself would mean that it does not matter whether one is 
obeying or disobeying orders, affirming or disavowing one’s superiority, pleasing or 
displeasing another, delighted or tormented in seeing others suffer; one is dehumanizing 
another or oneself purely for its own sake and nothing else. But Garcia’s four paradigmatic 
cases seem to involve fulfilling some further ends; they do not clearly illustrate 
dehumanization as an end in itself. If this is true, then either Garcia has misunderstood what 
direct violation of humanity consists in, or he actually thinks that indirect violation of 
humanity amounts to evil. As it stands, judging indirect violation of humanity as evil is not 
                                                            
7 I owe this observation to Dr. Swan. 
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compatible with his theory. In order to be consistent, he would have to reject these four cases 
as examples of evil actions, since evil actions, on his view, are actions in which humanity is 
violated as an end in itself. 
The second objection is built on the first. It seems that violating another’s humanity as a 
means to an end can deserve our harshest moral condemnation, contrary to Garcia’s view. I 
doubt that those who already consider Garcia’s four paradigmatic cases evil would change 
their mind just because I have shown them to be cases in which another’s humanity is used as 
a means to an end. Instead, I believe they would think that these cases remain worthy of our 
strongest moral condemnation. Consider another example: a kidnapper brutally beats up his 
young victim and sends pictures of the battered boy to the boy’s wealthy parents to extort a 
hefty ransom. To be sure, he is treating the boy simply as a means to procuring ready money 
while remaining indifferent to the boy’s suffering. Strictly speaking, the kidnapper is not 
violating the humanity of the boy as an end in itself. His cruel act can reasonably be regarded 
as a means to an end, which nonetheless seems worthy of our strongest moral disapproval, 
based on his deliberate cruel treatment of the boy and cold indifference to the boy’s suffering. 
Hence, it appears that violating another’s humanity as a means in some cases can plausibly be 
considered evil, and, in common moral language, also seems to count as dehumanization. For 
what seems to bother us is that the violation of another’s humanity is involved in the action – 
whether as a means or as an end does not seem to make a crucial moral difference. Given that 
violating another’s humanity as a means or as an end counts as dehumanization, one can 
plausibly take dehumanization to be an evil-making property. 
Moreover, if the above analysis is correct, it implies that the material object of an agent’s 
will is unable to draw a clear qualitative distinction between evil and immoral actions, 
contrary to Garcia’s claim. To see this, compare Garcia’s example of making a false promise 
to another person with my kidnap example: the object of the agents’ maxims in these two 
examples is to procure ready money; both agents similarly treat the humanity of another 
person as a means to an end. Yet, the action of one is merely wrong (according to Garcia) 
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while the action of the other evil (as I have argued in the previous paragraph). As shown, the 
kidnapper’s cruel treatment of the boy to achieve his selfish end deserves our strongest moral 
disapproval, since his action can plausibly count as a violation of another’s humanity. 
Therefore, the material object of an agent’s will does not seem able to support a strong 
qualitative thesis. Notwithstanding, I think Garcia’s notion of evil as dehumanization has the 
potential of delineating a distinct quality of evil. I will develop this notion further in my 
formulation of an alternate theory in Chapter 5. 
Third, it seems that the amount of harm that results from a vile action does constitute a 
significant part of the ordinary sense of evil. The kidnap example suggests that the harm 
suffered by the boy (i.e. the brutal beatings and excruciating pain) also contributes to our 
sense that the kidnapper has done something evil. It does not seem acceptable to hold that the 
object of the kidnapper’s maxim, as captured by Garcia’s theory, fully characterizes the 
evilness found in that case. To be sure, dehumanization can involve severe harm; hence, there 
is no reason to restrict our assessment of the kidnapper’s action to his motive only, and 
neglect the atrocious harm he imposes on his victim. This consideration of the harm element 
is all the more pertinent if, as theorists of evil, our aim is to gain a comprehensive view of evil 
actions. Hence, Garcia’s theory suffers a problem characteristic of perpetrator-centered 
theories: its conception of evil actions is one-sided, in that it fails to produce a developed 
account of harm or treat the severity of harm as relevant and crucial to a judgment of evil. 
Fourth, if we are aiming for a comprehensive view of evil, it would certainly not do to 
limit our investigation to the motivational aspect of the perpetrator’s psychology, for there is 
also an affective aspect to it. To use the kidnap example again, if the kidnapper enjoys 
brutalizing the boy or is coldly indifferent to the boy’s suffering, a robust theory of evil 
actions should be able to capture this sinister property to supply more insight into the nature 
of evil actions. Hence, given the complexity of human psychology, Garcia’s theory takes too 
narrow a view of it by concentrating only on the motivational aspect. 
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In this section, I have shown that Garcia’s four paradigmatic cases do not accurately 
depict dehumanization as an end in itself. Instead, they seem to be cases in which 
dehumanization is performed as a means to an end. If this is true, then his argument that evil 
actions are direct violation of humanity will be seriously undermined. The only viable option 
for him is thus to deny that his four paradigms are cases of evil. I have also argued that it is 
irrelevant whether one violates another’s humanity as a means or as an end in itself – either, I 
think, can rightly be considered evil because dehumanization itself can plausibly be taken to 
be an evil-making property. Moreover, given the possibility that evil and wrong actions could 
aim to achieve the same state of affairs, Garcia’s theory is unable to draw a clear qualitative 
difference between them based on the material object of an agent’s will. I have also noted that 
Garcia’s theory suffers a general shortcoming of perpetrator-centered theories: it fails to give 
weight to the severity of harm in the moral appraisal of evil actions. Additionally, it has a 
problem peculiar to his account: it takes a narrow view of the relevant psychology by 
considering only the perpetrator’s motive and ignoring his affect; to be sure, a theory that 
limits its analysis of evil to just one aspect of the perpetrator’s psychology is not 
comprehensive. Hence, in light of these deficiencies, it is clear that Garcia’s theory fails to 
fulfill the three criteria for a robust theory of evil actions: (1) its conception of evil actions is 
not balanced due to its neglect of victim factors; (2) that violating another’s humanity counts 
as evil only when performed as an end in itself appears intuitively implausible; (3) its 
usefulness is limited in that it only accounts for the motivational aspect of the perpetrator’s 
psychology and fails to draw a firm distinction between evil and wrong actions. 
Notwithstanding, I think that his proposal of evil as dehumanization is plausible and 
intuitively appealing. 
3.2 Steiner: Evil Action as Pleasurable Wrongdoing 
Steiner attempts to give an account of evil actions that will capture what he deems to be 
the four properties of evil “reflected in ordinary usage”: (i) “it is not simply synonymous with 
other terms of negative moral appraisal,” such as ‘bad,’ ‘wrong’ and ‘disvaluable’; (ii) it 
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“applies independently to acts,” i.e. the evilness of an act is not derived from the evilness of 
the agent or the resulting state of affairs; (iii) “it is a wrong-intensifier in the aggravating or 
qualitative sense,” and not merely in the quantitative sense; (iv) “it admits of quantitative 
variability” – i.e. evil can be “calibrated” (2002, p. 184). Steiner contends that there is “some 
non-negligible demand” for a conception of evil to meet these four conditions because they 
are well entrenched in ordinary usage (ibid., p. 191). 
To help him arrive at a conception of evil that will satisfy conditions (i) through (iv), 
Steiner analyzes a situation in which someone eats “a sumptuous meal under the gaze of 
starving children from whom that food has been confiscated” (2002, p. 188) – an action he 
takes to be evil. He identifies three properties that seem to make this action wrong: (1) it 
“may be wrong to eat a sumptuous meal at all, in a world with starving children”; (2) it is 
“wrong to do so under their gaze”; (3) it is “certainly wrong to eat food that belongs to them” 
(ibid., italics original). Since these three properties appear to be wrong-making properties, 
labeling the act as evil, Steiner contends, would imply that the evilness depicted here is a case 
of “wrong-intensification of a purely quantitative kind” (ibid.). So the question is: what is it, 
then, that could make the act of feasting before starving children evil in a qualitative sense 
(2002, p. 189)? 
According to Steiner, the notion of “self-indulgence” seems to be the obvious answer: the 
supposed pleasure that the sumptuous eater is deriving from his wrongful act is what makes it 
evil (ibid.). More precisely, “[e]vil acts are wrong acts that are pleasurable for their doers” 
(ibid.). In other words, it is the presence of the property of pleasure, in association with the 
wrong-making properties, which renders an action evil. Yet, for him, an evil action need not 
always consist in taking delight in doing something wrong; it can also consist in doing a 
wrongful act with “affective indifference” (2002, note 10). Hence, Steiner’s conception of 
evil is based on the affective properties of pleasure and indifference. Such a conception, he 
maintains, will be able to satisfy conditions (i) through (iii) (2002, p. 189). 
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One may reasonably presume he means this in precise terms: (i) an affect-based account 
of evil actions will yield a meaning of ‘evil’ that is not synonymous with other terms of 
negative appraisal such as ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’; (ii) affective properties can be applied 
independently to actions “without logically committing its users to the existence of any 
connection between the evilness of those actions and the evilness of their perpetrators” (2002, 
p. 184); and (iii) affective properties are qualitatively different from other wrong-making 
properties. 
To satisfy condition (iv) – that evil can be calibrated – Steiner proposes to combine “the 
scale of wrongness with that of pleasure” (2002, p. 190). For he thinks that calibrating the 
evilness of an evil act requires a “compound scale” (ibid.). One obvious implication of such a 
scale, he notes, is that certain actions can be “very wrong but not – if at all – very evil” due to 
the presence of a small amount of pleasure, while “some highly evil acts, though they must be 
wrong ones, may be only marginally so” due to the presence of a large amount of pleasure 
(ibid., italics original). For instance, a Nazi doctor who takes little pleasure in performing 
gruesome experiments on Auschwitz inmates is doing something very wrong but not very evil 
(ibid.); on the other hand, joy riders and computer hackers who take great delight in their 
actions are doing something marginally wrong but very evil (2002, note 13).  
Yet, some people, Steiner anticipates, may find the calibration of evil counterintuitive. 
They may object to his assessment of the actions of joy riders and computer hackers, for it 
seems intuitively implausible to consider trivial wrongs, even when performed with great 
delight, evil (ibid.). To test whether calibration of evil based on wrongness and pleasure is 
indeed counterintuitive, he uses an illustration of “two Nazi doctors performing similarly 
gruesome experiments on similar numbers of Auschwitz inmates”: the first gains little 
pleasure, while the second much, from their actions (2002, p. 190). According to him, 
however we calibrate the wrongness and evilness of their deeds, “our assessment of the 
second [Nazi doctor] is bound to be the more adverse of the two” (ibid.). Since the degree of 
wrongness of their actions is identical – apparently, their actions contribute equal units of 
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disvalue or are equally forbidden – the difference, he contends, would have to lie solely in the 
evilness of their actions, i.e. the amount of pleasure they gain from performing their actions 
(ibid.). And the reason why we judge the action of the second Nazi doctor more adversely, he 
explains, is because he derives more pleasure than does his colleague from performing the 
same wrong action (ibid.). Hence, after calibration, it comes out more evil (ibid.). 
I think Steiner has captured a relevant evil-making property that resonates with our basic 
intuitions about evil actions. That a cruel act, for instance, is performed with relish appears 
evil. There is also something sinister about it, which matches the strong sense of evil. Hence, 
affective property is salient to the ordinary notion of evil; a robust theory of evil actions 
should, I think, take it into account. Furthermore, I agree with him that the property of 
perverse affect constitutes a distinct quality of evil. A theory of evil actions that incorporates 
such an element into its framework seems able to support the qualitative thesis. 
Notwithstanding, there are a few issues concerning his account. First, by restricting evil-
making properties to the affective aspect of the perpetrator’s psychology, Steiner’s theory 
shares a similar shortcoming as Garcia’s: it lacks comprehensiveness in its construal of the 
perpetrator’s psychology in evil actions. Furthermore, as mentioned in my analysis of Card’s 
theory in Chapter 2, there is a place to identify abhorrent motives in our conception of evil 
actions. To describe further Steiner’s example, suppose the sumptuous eater is motivated by 
malevolence – i.e. he aims to torment the children psychologically simply because it is 
deplorable to do so. A robust theory would factor such abhorrent motive into its analysis. 
Unfortunately, Steiner’s theory does not provide such insight. 
Second, being perpetrator-centered, Steiner’s theory fails to give weight to the harm 
element. As argued in my critique of Garcia’s theory, taking the severity of harm into account 
will yield a more comprehensive view of evil actions. Consider Steiner’s example again: it 
seems that the severity of harm also contributes substantially to our sense that the sumptuous 
eater has done something evil. Watching someone feasting right before one’s eyes and eating 
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food that rightly belongs to one, when one is already starving, is surely a great mental torture. 
Given the unspeakable mental anguish suffered by the children, it seems unacceptable to omit 
such obvious and important detail in characterizing the evilness of this case. Therefore, 
Steiner’s theory is inadequate in that the harm factor is largely ignored in its conception of 
evil actions – which is a flaw common to perpetrator-centered theories. 
To sum up this section, I think Steiner captures accurately part of the ordinary notion of 
evil: evil actions are actions in which the agent takes pleasure in or is indifferent to doing 
something terrible or seeing others suffer. Such a conception, I think, is compatible with the 
qualitative thesis, though there are a few inadequacies. First, he restricts his analysis of the 
perpetrator’s psychology to its affective aspect, which is not a thorough treatment given the 
complexity of the relevant psychology. Second, his theory suffers a general shortcoming 
found in perpetrator-centered theories: the failure to incorporate the victim factor into its 
characterization of evil actions. These omissions thus undermine its capacity to offer a 
comprehensive view of evil actions. In light of the above deficiencies, it is clear that Steiner’s 
theory does not make a robust theory of evil actions: (1) the condition of balance is not met 
due to its failure to consider victim factors; (2) its usefulness is limited because of its narrow 
conception of the perpetrator’s psychology in evil actions. 
In this chapter, I have analyzed two theories of evil actions that characterize evil actions 
based on a single property related to the perpetrator. My investigation reveals that these 
theories do not fare better than victim-centered ones, for they are also inadequate. First, being 
perpetrator-centered, they neglect victim factors that seem to contribute significantly to the 
ordinary sense of evil in most cases. Second, they take a narrow view of the perpetrator’s 
psychology by considering only one aspect of it – either motivational or affective. Hence, 
even though these theories take the perpetrator’s psychological factors into consideration, 
they fail to produce accounts of evil actions that do justice to the thick concept of evil. 
Nevertheless, I find Garcia’s view of evil as dehumanization and Steiner’s affect-based 
account intuitively appealing. These ideas are crucial to the development of my theory in 
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Chapter 5. In the next chapter, I will examine two theories of evil actions that employ both 
victim and perpetrator factors to conceive of evil actions. On the face of it, these theories look 
more appealing than the ones examined so far since they adopt a balanced approach. We shall 




















4 The Combination Approach 
In the previous two chapters, I have examined four theories of evil actions that take a 
single approach – either victim or perpetrator. My analysis results show that these theories do 
not make robust theories of evil actions because they fail to satisfy the proposed three criteria 
adequately. In this chapter, I will investigate two theories of evil actions that incorporate both 
the victim and perpetrator factors – namely Formosa’s (2008) and de Wijze’s (2002). It is 
obvious that their theories meet the condition of balance, but whether they offer intuitively 
plausible and useful accounts of evil actions will be examined in the next two sections. 
Briefly, Formosa offers a conception of evil that has three main components, which, he 
contends, is the minimum requirement of a plausible combination approach (2008, p. 223). 
Interestingly, de Wijze also proposes three conditions of evil, which he claims, “serve as a 
complex boundary within which the uniqueness of evil actions can best be understood” (2002, 
p. 218). 
4.1 Formosa: A Combination Theory of Evil 
Formosa’s theory of evil actions has three components outlining perpetrator, 
unjustifiability, and victim factors (2008, p. 223). The perpetrator component seeks to specify 
“the way evil acts are perpetrated” (ibid.). Drawing on Kekes’s proposal in The Roots of Evil, 
Formosa claims that there are many different motives for evildoing such as “envy, malice, 
greed, hatred, boredom, honor, pride, revenge, ambition, thoughtlessness, a lack of self-
esteem, ideology, and faith” – referred to as “roots of evil” (2008, p. 220). He maintains that 
“relatively normal and comprehensible motives” (e.g. greed) as well as abnormal ones (e.g. 
sadism) can, at times, drive people to do evil (2008, p. 222). However, he finds it 
“unnecessarily restrictive” to consider only the motives and intentions of the perpetrator in 
our assessment of evil acts. He thinks that there are other factors which are also relevant, but 
“neither necessary nor sufficient, for judging an act to be evil” (2008, p. 224). He identifies 
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six factors, which, he says, do not have to be uniformly applicable to all cases – “different 
sets of factors may be more or less relevant” in different cases (ibid.). 
The first factor is “the directedness of the perpetrator’s intention” (ibid.). It may be a 
truism that a direct intention to harm others is wrong and possibly evil, but Formosa holds 
that harm need not be directly intended in order for the act to qualify as evil (2008, p. 225). 
On his view, “it is enough that the evildoer intends to act in a way such that harm is a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act” and that “[i]n general, an evildoer who acts 
intentionally can purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently perpetrate evil” (ibid.). He 
also says that an evildoer need not believe what he does is evil, because he may have 
convinced himself “through a process of self-deception and rationalization” that his act is 
justifiable (ibid.). He gives an example to illustrate this point: suppose Hitler genuinely 
believes that his genocidal actions are justified, after having rationalized “his hatred for the 
Jews by way of ideology” (ibid.). According to him, it would not be intuitively implausible to 
still rate Hitler’s actions as evil (ibid.). However, he qualifies, an act that is perpetrated by an 
agent who believes it to be evil would normally be judged more harshly than one that is 
perpetrated by another who believes it to be justifiable “as the result of self-deception and 
rationalization” (ibid.). Hence, for Formosa, it is relevant to the assessment of evil actions that 
harm is purposely and directly intended, or knowingly, recklessly or negligently brought 
about (ibid.). 
According to Formosa, the second factor relevant to a judgment of evil is the strength and 
type of the perpetrator’s motive. Here, he draws on Kant’s proposal that “the degree of 
viciousness of an act is inversely proportional to the strength of the temptation to perform that 
act” (ibid.). Citing a case of an agent who kills his spouse and his spouse’s lover in a fit of 
jealousy and violent rage, he suggests that the reason why we might be disinclined to call the 
agent’s action evil is because he is, “in some sense, provoked, and acts with frailty in the heat 
of the moment” (2008, p. 233). In such a case, Formosa contends, “a certain amount of 
strength of will” would be required not to act in that way (2008, p. 226). In other words, the 
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strength of motive (to harm another) is relatively weak in the jealous and raging spouse, for 
he does not have to, so to speak, go out of his way to perpetrate harm. In contrast, the strength 
of motive in a Nazi who gratuitously inflicts harm and humiliation on the Jews is relatively 
strong because the Nazi is presumably not provoked, and “does not act in the heat of the 
moment under the powerful influence of an emotional fit” (ibid.). Hence, if we are inclined to 
judge the Nazi’s actions evil but are disinclined to do so in the case of the jealous spouse, then, 
he argues, “the strength of motive is clearly relevant to a judgment of evil” (ibid.). He also 
points out that sometimes, the type of motive, “whatever its strength,” is relevant too (ibid.). 
Suppose a sadist has “an overwhelmingly strong desire” to torture children and gets into “a fit 
of passion whenever he sees vulnerable children” (ibid.). In that sense, “his acts of torture are 
not at all gratuitous, given his desires and passions” (ibid.). However, Formosa contends, 
though the sadist may need a great amount of will not to perpetrate evil, we would not 
hesitate to judge his acts evil, “given the type of motive that moves him” (ibid.). 
The third factor has to do with “the effect of the harmful action upon the perpetrator” 
(2008, p. 224). If an agent takes great pleasure in, or is coldly indifferent to, his horrific acts, 
it may incline us to condemn them in the harshest moral terms (2008, p. 226). On the other 
hand, if he is repelled by the harmful effects of his own actions and immediately feels 
remorse and regret, we may hesitate to label his acts as evil (ibid.).8 
The fourth factor concerns “the nature and degree of the harm intended” (2008, p. 224). 
Formosa requires that all evil acts inflict “a certain minimum amount of harm” (2008, p. 226). 
In other words, the amount of harm intended by the evildoer must be significant and not 
trivial. This being so, actions that are intended to murder “an entire group, or even all of 
humanity,” would be more likely to elicit harsher moral condemnation than those aimed at 
murdering just one person (ibid.). 
                                                            
8 Unfortunately, Formosa fails to explain why he thinks the perpetrator’s remorseful response would 
detract from the evilness of his action. At any rate, I find his claim about the relevance of the agent’s 
remorse rather implausible and will take issue with it later. 
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The fifth factor deals with “the intricacies of the situation in which the act was 
undertaken” (ibid.). Formosa believes that there is some connection between the way people 
act and their situations; it is thus relevant to a judgment of evil that certain situations strongly 
encourage evil while others discourage it (2008, p. 227). For instance, a person who finds 
himself in evil-encouraging situations such as war, a shortage of basic needs, poverty, social 
upheaval, and a general lack of education and opportunities “is more likely to perpetrate evil” 
(ibid.). For “such situations tend to, in some sense, provoke or encourage evil actions” (ibid.). 
This may in turn, he contends, make us “less likely to judge an act evil” where it is committed 
under evil-encouraging circumstances, all things being equal (ibid.). 
The sixth factor that Formosa identifies as relevant to a judgment of evil concerns the 
perpetrator’s circumstances. He explains that certain upbringings where there is a lack of 
“education, love, and nurturing, can sometimes tend to encourage evil in later life” (ibid.). 
Thus, all things being equal, an abhorrent act that is committed by an agent who grows up in a 
violent, uncaring and abusive environment will less likely be considered evil (ibid.). 
The second component of Formosa’s theory – i.e. unjustifiability – identifies what makes 
evil acts morally unjustifiable (2008, p. 223). For Formosa, “an evil act is one where an agent 
perpetrates a moral wrong that makes him at least partly responsible for the harms others 
suffer” (2008, p.228). His account of unjustifiability is actually a simplification of Card’s 
account, which says that if an agent acts in such a way that he brings about, seriously risks, 
sustains, aggravates or tolerates serious harm, his action lacks a morally acceptable excuse 
and is therefore evil (2008, p. 227).9 He finds Card’s account appealing because it is able to 
deal with cases of negligence, recklessness, or passiveness, where serious harms are 
aggravated or tolerated but not directly intended or inflicted upon others (ibid.). And he 
                                                            
9 Card does not explicitly say that the agent must know he is acting in such a way in order to render his 
(evil) act morally inexcusable. She seems to be more concerned about whether intolerable harm is 
foreseeable when attended with reasonable care (2005, p. 20; 2010, p. 23). If yes, the action is morally 
inexcusable (2010, p. 23). 
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believes he can capture such cases by simply stating whether the perpetrator is responsible – 
or at least, partly responsible – for the harm suffered by others.  
The victim component deals with the amount of harm that evil acts inflict (2008, p. 223). 
Formosa requires that the harm involved in such acts be what he calls ‘life-wrecking’ or ‘life-
ending’ (2008, p. 228). His conception of a life-wrecking harm is drawn from Kekes’ works 
(1990, 1998). It refers to a harm that “violates the minimum conditions of human well-being 
in such a way that it interferes with a person’s ability to function as a fully-fledged agent” for 
a reasonable period of time (2008, p. 229). He cites the following examples: “intense and 
prolonged suffering,” inhibition of “one’s ability to perform normal human activities,” 
inducement of “severe and debilitating trauma,” undermining of “one’s moral character,” 
hindering of one’s ability to maintain, nurture, and begin new relationships, and undermining 
of “one’s ability to be autonomous and to cultivate a sense of dignity and self-worth” (ibid.). 
Such harms, he adds, “are generally irreversible and beyond compensation” (ibid.). 
Combining the three components, Formosa arrives at the following tripartite conception 
of evil: 
An evil act is an act of wrongdoing in which the perpetrator of that act is at least partly 
responsible for other individuals suffering what would at least normally be a life-
wrecking or ending harm, and where in so acting we judge the perpetrator, in the light of 
all the relevant factors, to be deserving of our very strongest moral condemnations. The 
relevant factors include intention, motive, effect, degree of harm, and the perpetrator’s 
situation and circumstances. (2008, p. 230) 
Given the various factors relevant to a judgment of evil, Formosa says that we need to weigh 
them “in combination” and engage in careful and thorough reflection in order to attain “an 
overall judgment” of whether an act is evil (ibid.). To illustrate the practical aspect of his 
theory, he applies it to a case of a pedophile who has very strong desires to abuse children 
sexually and regularly does so, despite knowing that his actions are wrong (2008, p. 231). At 
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first glance, this looks like a clear cut case of evil, but, Formosa argues, other relevant factors, 
assuming they are present, may make it less so (ibid.). For instance, the pedophile is always 
so gripped with remorse soon after every act of sexual exploitation that he has been actively 
seeking professional help (in vain) and deliberately avoiding being with children; furthermore, 
he has a history of sexual abuse as a child, and is currently suffering from depression and 
alcohol addiction (ibid.). But Formosa is quick to point out that the presence of such factors 
does not mean that his actions are justified or that his responsibility is diminished (ibid.). 
Rather, the question here is whether the pedophile’s actions, in view of the above factors, 
“deserve our very strongest moral condemnation” (2008, p. 232). It might be the case that 
some of us give more weight to “the degree of life-wrecking harms inflicted upon innocent 
children” than the pedophile’s reformative efforts (ibid.). At any rate, Formosa’s point here is 
that “much critical reflection and careful judgment is required to decide the matter” (ibid.). 
Here, he seems to imply that the case of the remorseful pedophile is a hard case. But he 
suggests that his theory is able to, without much difficulty, account for many “clearer cut 
examples of evil” (ibid.). He cites two such examples: Hitler’s actions are evil because of his 
primary responsibility “for the murders of millions of people,” his “fanatical hatred of Jews, 
the sheer scale of his acts, his cunning deceitfulness, his complete lack of remorse and his 
single-minded pursuit of the destruction of so many innocent [people]”; Eichmann’s actions 
are evil because of his partial responsibility for sending millions of Jews to their deaths, “the 
sheer scale of his acts, the grotesque and thoughtless efficiency with which he undertook the 
acts, and his cold indifference to the harms he inflicted” (ibid.). 
I think Formosa’s combination approach has pointed us in the right direction towards 
conceptualizing evil actions. An approach that takes into account both the perpetrator and 
victim factors is surely more adequate than one which relies mainly on a single perspective 
(as is evident in my analyses in Chapters 2 and 3). I think he also offers a rather informative 
list of perpetrator factors that are mostly relevant to a judgment of evil. In that sense, he 
widens our understanding of the rich and complex nature of evil actions. Recall that, on his 
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theory, there are three necessary components to evil actions: (1) the perpetrator component 
postulates factors such as intention, motive, effect, degree of harm and the perpetrator’s 
situation and circumstances; (2) the unjustifiability component stipulates that the perpetrator 
must at least be partially responsible for making others suffer; (3) the victim component 
requires his action to inflict life-wrecking or -ending harm on others (2008, p. 230). It seems 
that such an account would be compatible with the qualitative thesis, for it is able to 
accommodate a variety of distinctive qualities that are appropriate for evil actions. For 
instance, an action in which the perpetrator is motivated by sadism and takes great delight in 
inflicting life-wrecking harm on other persons is qualitatively different from one in which no 
perverse affect, diabolical motive or life-wrecking harm is involved (e.g. pickpocketing). 
Unfortunately, there are a few issues concerning Formosa’s theory. First, he fails to 
specify what sort of motive, “whatever its strength” (2008, p. 226), would or should incline us 
to judge an action evil. Although he cites a sadist who has an overwhelming desire to torture 
children as an example (ibid.), he does not explain why he thinks that the motive of sadism, 
regardless of its strength, would render an action evil. Without this explanation, it will be 
difficult for us to identify other such motives; this undermines the usefulness of his theory. 
Hence, one can only speculate his rationale for considering this factor: perhaps, it is due to the 
perverseness of some motives like sadism, in contrast to common motives such as greed and 
ambition. In any case, it is not clear how Formosa intends for us to apply this factor. 
Second, it does not seem plausible that if the perpetrator feels remorse and regret soon 
after witnessing the harmful consequences of his heinous action, he is not acting evilly, all 
other things being equal. Consider Formosa’s pedophile example: the pedophile genuinely 
feels remorse shortly after sexually abusing his victims and has been making sincere attempts 
at reformation (2008, p. 231). Formosa argues that these considerations are bound to make it 
less clear that the pedophile’s actions are evil (2008, p. 232). I disagree. He seems to be 
conflating evaluation of character with evaluation of action. A remorseful pedophile may not 
strike us as evil; but that judgment seems to be about his character and not his action. If we 
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agree that ordinary people can commit heinous crimes while evil people do not always 
commit them, then we should keep our judgments about the actions and the people separate 
(Morton, 2004, p. 65). Hence, it does not seem reasonable or fair to discount the evilness of 
the perpetrator’s action based on the sort of character he has. Consider the various factors 
relevant to this case: (1) the pedophile’s motive is to gratify his sexual urge; (2) he is under no 
provocation or threat to do so; (3) he commits the action deliberately, knowing that harm will 
be inflicted upon the bodies and minds of his young victims; (4) the children actually suffer 
life-wrecking harm. It seems that the same set of factors would also obtain in the case of a 
remorseless pedophile. The only difference between them appears to be this: the 
conscientious pedophile would feel sick with remorse after his actions while the 
conscienceless pedophile would not feel a tinge of remorse after them. Despite this difference, 
both continue to sexually abuse children. Now, in light of my analysis of these two cases, it 
will be unreasonable to rate the actions of the remorseful pedophile as merely wrong while 
those of a remorseless pedophile evil, when both act intentionally and inflict the same amount 
of harm. The only difference seems to lie in the sort of person they are, and not in the nature 
of their actions. Thus understood, the remorseful pedophile can reasonably be said to be 
acting evilly – less evilly, perhaps, than the remorseless one; in other words, the perpetrator’s 
conscientious response may mitigate the degree of evilness of his actions. Hence, this 
particular effect on the perpetrator – i.e. remorse after committing heinous wrongs – does not 
seem crucial to deciding whether an action is evil, contrary to Formosa’s claim. 
Third, it is doubtful that the perpetrator’s upbringing would make a crucial difference to 
the moral assessment of evil actions. Suppose the remorseless pedophile endures a difficult 
upbringing that contributes significantly to his hideous behavior: he was neglected and 
sexually abused as a child by one of his family members. Hence, he wants to take out his 
anger and frustrations on others by sexually abusing children. In fact, some of the most 
heinous crimes are committed by people who have experienced tough upbringings. Yet, the 
factor of tough upbringing should not detract from the evilness of such revolting actions. 
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Given the presence of the various relevant factors (listed earlier) in his case, it is clear that he 
has done something atrocious that warrants the judgment of evil. Moreover, upbringing seems 
to be a factor that is more relevant to character or general behavior rather than particular 
actions, since it plays a significant role in molding us into the sort of person we are. But, as 
mentioned earlier, we should keep our assessments about character and action separate.10 
Therefore, in order to rightly appreciate the evilness of hideous acts, we should omit 
considerations about upbringing and remorse in the assessment of evil actions, and treat them, 
instead, as relevant only to the degree of evilness.  
In this section, I have noted that Formosa’s theory is balanced in that it considers both 
perpetrator and victim factors; he also widens our understanding of evil actions by providing 
a list of factors relevant to a judgment of evil.  His tripartite conception of evil actions also 
seems able to accommodate the qualitative thesis. But there are some problems with his 
account. He fails to specify the sort of motive that would render an action evil regardless of 
its strength; he also fails to delineate its essence to facilitate identification of other such 
motives – this limits the applicability of his theory. Additionally, I have argued that the 
remorse experienced by the perpetrator after his actions is not obviously relevant to the moral 
appraisal of actions, for it does not seem to detract from the evilness of what he has done; his 
remorseful response afterwards seems more relevant to the evaluation of his character. In the 
same vein, the factor of upbringing seems to apply more to the assessment of the perpetrator’s 
character rather than his action, since it has to do with the shaping of general disposition and 
behavior. In light of the above difficulties, it is clear that Formosa’s combination theory is not 
sufficiently robust: (1) it can produce intuitively implausible results due to its conflation of 
                                                            
10 One might ask whether a difficult upbringing would remove blame from the perpetrator, even though 
his heinous actions can rightly count as evil. If blameworthiness has to do with censure and 
punishment, I think evildoers should still be blamed for acting evilly, despite having experienced tough 
upbringings. For, as pointed out by Formosa, many others suffer from similar experiences but do not 
perform evil actions (2008, p. 227). That said, I do not mean they also deserve the same amount of 
blame as those who do not experience tough upbringings. We may be more sympathetic towards them 
and hence feel less inclined to attribute them with the same amount of blame. 
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action evaluation with character evaluation; (2) it is not useful when it comes to identifying 
motives that can render actions evil whatever their strength. 
4.2 De Wijze: Three Sufficient Conditions of Evil 
De Wijze defends a theory of evil actions that advocates the qualitative nature of evil. 
Drawing on the notion of “dirty hands” – i.e. the concern that committing evil results in 
“irremovable moral pollution” – he argues that evil actions constitute a special class of 
terribly wrong actions that seem to “leave the agent and his victim morally defiled or stained” 
(2002, pp. 211, 213). He postulates three conditions, each of which is sufficient in itself to 
render an act evil and capture evil’s unique quality (2002, pp. 218, 221). On his view, evil 
actions are necessarily wrongful actions that satisfy at least one of the following conditions: 
A There is a deliberate violation of persons with the intention to dehumanise (that is, 
deny respect and dignity to) those powerless to retaliate. 
B The action or project will gratuitously inflict, or bring about, one or more of “The 
Great Harms” to sentient beings with the relevant moral standing. 
C The action or project (or professed morality) seeks to annihilate the “moral 
landscape.” 
(2002, p. 218, italics original) 
Condition A is meant to capture the distinctive intention of many evil actions – i.e. the 
intention to deliberately dehumanize others (ibid.). This condition is limited in that it does not 
apply to actions against non-persons (e.g. animals), for they “are incapable of being 
dehumanised” (2002, p. 219). He stresses that attempts to dehumanize only count as evil 
when they are performed on those “powerless” to defend themselves, because “[e]vil acts are 
those in which the perpetrators delight in the impotence and humiliation of those subject to 
their power” and relish being looked upon as the source of their degradation (ibid.). It is 
merely wrong when the victim is “powerful enough” to retaliate (ibid.). Another point to note, 
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he adds, is that acts of dehumanization must be intentional and not “an unavoidable by-
product of some other project” (ibid.). 
According to de Wijze, Condition B delivers the special sense of evil inherent in 
gratuitously bringing about certain states-of-affairs – what he calls the “The Great Harms,” 
“such as great physical suffering, illness, starvation, death, destruction of home or habitat and 
the misery of continual and unrelenting terror and harassment” (ibid.). Such harms can 
adversely affect any living creature (since they jeopardize the needs common to all living 
creatures) and are thus “to be prevented for reasons independent of reflective thought and any 
specific conception of evil” (ibid., italics original). But de Wijze recognizes that, given the 
imperfect features of our world, this is not always possible. Sometimes, good people are 
compelled to inflict such harms for morally acceptable reasons (2002, p. 220). Hence, on his 
view, the Great Harms must be produced or allowed to occur gratuitously in order for the 
action to be rated as evil (ibid.). By ‘sentient being’ he means any living creature that “has the 
relevant moral standing so that it ought to be protected from “The Great Harms” (ibid.). He 
admits that it is controversial as to which sentient beings count as having the relevant moral 
standing, but says that it is uncontroversial to classify human beings and, as some would 
argue, “large mammals and birds,” under this domain (ibid.). 
De Wijze makes clear that Condition C is meant to “explicate and formalise the essence 
of evil moralities or world-views” that seek to destroy the moral landscape (2002, p. 221). By 
‘moral landscape’ he means 
[T]hose prerequisite values needed for any civilised attempt to manage conflict and to 
establish a minimal level of respect and dignity between persons…[and] that aspect of all 
moral theories which seek to protect the weak from the strong and prevent a world where 
needless pain, suffering, and death are seen as preferable to joy, happiness and life. (ibid.) 
According to him, Nazism constitutes the quintessential example of an evil morality or 
worldview (ibid.). Under the Nazi worldview, “ordinary public activities” – e.g. “all forms of 
54 
 
bureaucratic decision-making, filing of secret reports, organising transport systems” – count 
as evil when performed to sustain the Nazi regime with an indifference to the extermination 
of the Jews, “especially the actions of those persons who could have slowed or hindered the 
aims of the Nazis without significant danger to themselves” (ibid.). It is the indifference of 
these people in the context of an evil world-view, he stresses, which turns their bureaucratic 
activities into evil actions. Such activities would still count as evil even if the persons 
performing them have no intention to dehumanize others (Condition A) or participate in or 
condone the perpetration of the Great Harms on the Jewish people (Condition B) (ibid.). On 
his view, an act that fulfills all three conditions will be considered as a quintessentially evil 
act (2002, pp. 223, 229). 
It is apparent that de Wijze’s theory takes the combination approach. The focus of 
Condition A, as stated explicitly, is “on the intention of the action” – which is clearly a factor 
concerning the perpetrator (2002, p. 217). Additionally, this condition also includes an 
affective element, for de Wijze states that the perpetrator’s intention to dehumanize another is 
usually accompanied by “delight in the impotence and humiliation of those subject to [his] 
power” (2002, p. 219). Hence, Condition A is not as limited as some perpetrator-centered 
accounts (e.g. Garcia’s and Steiner’s theories) in its construal of the evildoer’s psychology. 
Condition B is meant to capture the horrendous consequences of actions that are performed 
“for gratuitous reasons” (2002, p. 220). At first sight, this condition seems to outline a factor 
concerning the victim. But Condition B can also indicate “some psychological state that is not 
present to any degree in wrongs that are not inflicted gratuitously” (Russell, 2007, p. 665). In 
other words, sinister psychology is involved in deliberately inflicting the Great Harms 
unnecessarily or for no good reason; but the psychology involved in inflicting the Great 
Harms for a good reason may not be sinister at all. Hence, Condition B appears to contain 
both victim and perpetrator elements. Condition C focuses on “the essence of evil moralities 
or world views” which seek to invert the moral landscape (2002, p. 221). Like Condition B, it 
can also be treated as a compound component that contains both victim and perpetrator 
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factors, in that the attempt to annihilate the moral landscape is intentional or foreseeable. 
Besides displaying balance in its conception of evil actions, de Wijze’s theory is more 
adequate and appealing than Formosa’s because its application is not restricted to human 
beings but can also be extended to other sentient beings (e.g. animals) that have the relevant 
moral standing. 11  In addition, it seems capable of supporting the qualitative thesis. The 
intention to dehumanize defenseless victims, the gratuitous infliction of the Great Harms, and 
the deliberate attempt to annihilate the moral landscape seem to be convincing depictions of 
the unique nature of evil actions. One could apply them without much difficulty to draw a 
plausible qualitative distinction between, say, genocide in which a direct intention to 
dehumanize others and the infliction of the Great Harms are involved, and shoplifting in 
which none of the three attributes seems to obtain. 
Nevertheless, there are a few shortcomings in de Wijze’s account. First, even though 
Condition A takes both intentional and affective factors into account, it has two inadequacies: 
(1) its view of affect is restricted to that of taking perverse delight in dehumanizing others; (2) 
it fails to give sufficient treatment to motives. To be sure, perverse delight is not the only 
sinister affective state that characterizes evildoers; an evildoer could also be coldly indifferent 
to the suffering of his victims when dehumanizing them – such affective state seems equally 
sinister. I also think it is worth spelling out diabolical motives as part of the conception of evil 
actions, instead of generalizing them under the description of the intention to dehumanize; 
specifying them will certainly add further insight into the nature of evil actions. For instance, 
an action can be evil when it is motivated by malevolence. Suppose an agent is motivated by 
malevolence to go on a shooting spree in a school and actually brings about a great massacre. 
Besides identifying the severity of harm and the perpetrator’s intention to dehumanize, a 
robust theory of evil actions will be able to cast light on the type of motive involved in this 
case. To a lesser extent, Conditions B and C are also susceptible to the first objection: they do 
                                                            
11 Recall that, on Formosa’s account, life-wrecking harm is essentially a harm that jeopardizes “a 
person’s ability to function as a fully-fledged agent” (2008, p. 229). Hence, it does not seem able to 
accommodate harm committed against animals.  
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not provide information on evil-making motives. The point is, a robust account will be able to 
supply insight into the types of motives that generally make actions evil. In this regard, de 
Wijze’s theory does not seem to meet the mark. 
Second, Condition C seems too permissive. Given that actions that contribute to the 
destruction of the moral landscape are sufficient for evil, it then appears buying products 
made in sweatshops or eating the meat of animals raised in battery farms will amount to evil 
as well, since these actions can arguably be viewed as facilitating the continuation of evil 
morality in which little or no regard is given to values that “seek to protect the weak from the 
strong and prevent a world where needless pain, suffering, and death are seen as preferable to 
joy, happiness, and life” (2002, p. 221). The point is, de Wijze’s construal of Condition C is 
so broad that it seems to render many ordinary wrongs evil; it also does not help that his 
account is silent on how to identify actions that can properly be regarded as facilitating evil 
projects (Russell, 2007, p. 668). If routine bureaucratic activities that support the continuation 
of the Nazi regime count as evil, there seems to be no reason why daily economic activities 
that support the continuation of regimes that, say, practise child labour or sponsor terrorist 
organizations do not amount to evil under Condition C. This problem of permissiveness is 
further aggravated by de Wijze’s allowing indirect contribution to evil projects to count as 
evil too. For instance, he holds that “the indifference of many Germans, Poles, British and 
others to the fate of the Jews must be understood as evil, especially the actions of those 
persons who could have slowed or hindered the aims of the Nazis without significant danger 
to themselves” (2002, p. 221). Here, he is suggesting that the indifference of people in many 
parts of the world contributed indirectly to the Nazi’s sinister project; and so their actions – or 
lack thereof – deserve the strongest moral condemnation. Note that the intention to 
dehumanize is irrelevant to the assessment under Condition C (ibid.). If this analysis is correct, 
then, again, Condition C is allowing too much. For instance, many people are indifferent to 
the situation in regimes where the poor are oppressed and exploited, women are demeaned 
and abused, and children are made to work for long hours, without pay, in debilitating 
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conditions; these people, to be sure, have no intention to dehumanize others. But applying 
Condition C would render the indifference of these people – perhaps, of too many people in 
this world – evil. Such an assessment seems overly harsh. Granted that being indifferent to 
evil morality or worldview is not right, but to condemn it in the strongest degree – especially 
when the intention to dehumanize others is lacking – does not seem appropriate. Furthermore, 
if being indifferent amounts to contributing indirectly to the continuation of an evil regime 
and therefore evil, it is difficult to see how merely having sympathy for people living under 
such a regime – without doing anything to alleviate their sufferings – does not also amount to 
the same thing. After all, those who are sympathetic to others’ sufferings can also be said to 
be contributing indirectly to the continuation of evil moralities by being passive. And there 
seems to be no principle in Condition C to rule out a sympathetic but passive response from a 
judgment of evil; for, like indifference, it also contributes indirectly to the destruction of the 
moral landscape. Yet, allowing sympathetic response to count as evil is evidently not 
compatible with Condition C, or in line with de Wijze’s project of defining the essence of evil. 
Hence, de Wijze would have to provide explanation or guidelines as to why indifference – 
and not other kinds of passive response – deserves the ascription of evil under Condition C. 
Therefore, in view of the difficulties in applying this condition, de Wijze must delineate more 
clearly its parameters or narrow them further in order to avoid counterintuitive results. 
In this section, I have noted that, on de Wijze’s theory, Condition A delineates a 
perpetrator factor while Conditions B and C victim and perpetrator factors. His theory appears 
compatible with the qualitative thesis, and is appealing in that it can be applied to gratuitous 
harm imposed on animals. But there are a few problems. I have argued that Conditions A 
through C are not illuminating with regard to the distinctive affective and motivational 
qualities of evil; hence, their accounts of the perpetrator’s psychology are insufficient. I have 
also spelled out the difficulties of applying Condition C; this condition seems too permissive 
or ambiguous to capture properly the uniqueness of evil actions. In light of the above 
problems, it is apparent that de Wijze’s theory, despite taking a balanced approach, does not 
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make a robust theory of evil actions: (1) it is susceptible to counterintuitive outcome given the 
permissiveness of Condition C; (2) his account is not very useful in identifying perverse 
affect and diabolical motives in evil actions. 
In this chapter, I have analyzed two theories that adopt the combination approach. My 
investigation reveals that these combination theories fail to be sufficiently robust theories of 
evil actions even though they consider both victim and perpetrator factors. The main problem 
of Formosa’s theory is that it conflates factors relevant to the assessment of action with those 
relevant to the assessment of character – this makes his theory vulnerable to counterintuitive 
results in some straightforward cases. De Wijze’s theory is also exposed to the same risk of 
making counterintuitive assessments due to its laxness in at least one of his criteria for evil 
and inadequate treatment of the perpetrator’s psychology. With this conclusion to the chapter, 
I have also completed my analysis of the six contemporary theories of evil actions. I am now 
in the position to present an alternate theory of evil actions, which, I shall argue, is more 












5 An Alternate Theory 
In the last three chapters, I have examined six theories of evil actions classified 
according to the approach they adopt to conceive of evil actions. I have argued that the 
combination approach is more adequate than the victim or perpetrator approach, as it takes 
factors concerning victim and perpetrator into account. In addition, I have noted that some of 
the views advanced in these theories are persuasive and illuminating with regard to the nature 
of evil actions. However, I have also observed that certain parts of their accounts are deficient 
in that they lack either plausibility or sufficient details. I hope the analysis of these six 
theories has given us a clearer idea of the nature of evil actions and what makes a robust 
theory of evil actions. In this chapter, I will present what I think is a more complete and 
plausible account of evil actions that will avoid the problems faced by the theories analyzed in 
this thesis. That said, I must also acknowledge the authors of these theories for their insights 
on the nature of evil, which partly contribute to the development of my theory. In what 
follows, I will specify what these insights are, before presenting my theory in detail in the 
next section. 
With regard to the victim component, Kekes, Card, Formosa and de Wijze, interestingly, 
give similar accounts of harm that are called by different names: simple harm, intolerable 
harm, life-wrecking harm and the Great Harms respectively. I think their conceptions of harm 
can generally be construed as the undermining or destruction of basic quality of life. I find 
such harm appropriate for a judgment of evil, as it is sufficiently distinct and severe. My 
conception of harm is inspired by their accounts. 
With regard to the perpetrator component, first, I am inclined towards Garcia’s 
conception of evil as dehumanization, for I think it resonates deeply with our considered 
moral sensibilities and seems able to delineate clearly the qualitative difference of evil. 
However, as argued in Chapter 3, I disagree with Garcia that the act of violating another’s 
humanity amounts to evil only when it is performed as an end in itself; it seems to warrant the 
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strongest moral condemnation even when performed as a means to an end – provided that its 
role as a means lacks moral justification. Like Garcia, de Wijze also identifies 
dehumanization as a unique quality of evil; more precisely, it is the intention to dehumanize 
defenceless persons. I think the element of intention is certainly relevant to the assessment of 
evil actions and will give it a detailed treatment in my account. Second, I agree with Card and 
Formosa that harmful actions need not be intentional. When the perpetrator knows or foresees 
that his action may lead to the side effect of serious harm and yet acts without letting it worry 
him, his action can plausibly count as evil. Third, Steiner appears to have identified a salient 
factor for a judgment of evil – the perpetrator’s affect. Most people would probably find 
committing unjustified harmful actions in a state of indifference or perverse delight deserving 
of the highest degree of moral disapproval. 
Lastly, in more general terms, I am inclined towards Formosa’s method of weighing in 
combination the various factors relevant to a judgment of evil. I think evil is a rich and 
complex concept; hence, we should not restrict our conception of evil to just a few factors. In 
addition, as Formosa suggests, not all factors carry equal weights in determining the evilness 
of actions – some seem weightier than others. For instance, he says that the perpetrator’s 
circumstances seem less important in comparison with intention, motive and the degree of 
harm (2008, p. 227). Though I think Formosa is mistaken in positing the perpetrator’s 
situation and circumstances as factors relevant to the moral assessment of evil actions, I find 
his suggestion that different factors contribute in varying degrees to our sense of evil 
intuitively appealing – it rightly reflects the complexity often involved in appraising evil 
actions. The points listed above are the ones that have significantly shaped my thoughts about 
evil actions and influenced the way I formulate my theory.  
5.1 Evil as Flagrant Disrespect for Human Worth and Life 
My theory has two distinct components: one outlines a victim factor while the other 
perpetrator factors. As should be obvious, my theory takes the combination approach. These 
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two components postulate four conditions of evil. The victim component outlines a condition 
that has to do with the sort of harm imposed on another while the perpetrator component 
involves three psychological conditions – i.e. intention, motive and affect. The four 
conditions must obtain in order to render an act evil. Nevertheless, when monstrous 
psychological conditions are present, the condition of harm need not be satisfied. I will 
explain why later. In essence, evil actions, on my theory, are significantly harmful actions that 
manifest flagrant disrespect or disregard for human worth and life. It is akin to treating other 
persons simply as objects or vermin to be abused, exploited, taken advantage of, humiliated, 
or destroyed, on unjustified grounds. Admittedly, there is a Kantian ring to my conception of 
evil. However, it differs from a Kantian conception of immoral actions in that consequence or 
harm is considered to be relevant to the moral assessment of actions. 
This view of evil as flagrant disrespect or disregard for the human worth and life of 
another is grounded on the assumption that every human being has intrinsic worth, by which 
he demands basic respect for himself from his fellows. Kantianism is arguably the most 
prominent advocate of the intrinsic value of human beings. Several modern thinkers also 
advocate similar views. Raimond Gaita thinks that all human beings are owed unconditional 
respect and may not be killed “as though we were ridding the world of vermin, even if we kill 
them just to stop them from doing further evil” (2004, p. 7). Gregory Vlastos (1962) argues 
that all persons have equal worth as human beings, though they may have unequal merits 
based on gradable qualities such as talents, skills, and character trait. Joel Feinberg contends 
that universal respect for human beings is groundless – “a kind of ultimate attitude not itself 
justifiable in more ultimate terms” (1973, p. 93). I generally share their moral sentiments. 
That all human beings deserve basic respect because they have intrinsic worth is an important 
assumption underlying my theory. This basic respect that we owe to every human being, as 
advanced on my theory, means that we are not to harm or kill another without a good moral 
reason – this is the basic respect we owe to every human being. On the other hand, harming 
evildoers is not a show of flagrant disrespect for human worth, since the evildoers have 
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forfeited the basic respect we owe to them – assuming that we have good moral reasons to 
harm them and that the harm imposed on them is not dehumanizing or disproportionate. 
 
5.2 The Victim Component: Dehumanizing Harm and Death 
The victim component describes the sort of harm that renders an act evil, namely 
dehumanizing harm or death. On my theory, a deliberate infliction or sustaining, aggravating, 
or risking the infliction of dehumanizing harm or death on another meets a condition for evil. 
My account of dehumanizing harm, as mentioned earlier, is largely similar to accounts of 
simple harm, intolerable harm, life-wrecking harm and the Great Harms, in that the harm 
relevant here is one that destroys or adversely affects basic quality of life or human life. 
Though the points given in the other harm accounts are mostly applicable to dehumanizing 
harm, I want to elaborate further a few of them. By ‘basic quality of life’ I mean basic 
physiological and psychological wellbeing. Naturally, basic physiological wellbeing requires 
a certain minimum amount of food, water and rest, and freedom from constant excruciating 
pain, among other things. Basic psychological wellbeing, on the other hand, includes having a 
healthy sense of self-worth and dignity, and freedom from mental distress and constant fear, 
among other things. Dehumanizing harm is, thus, harm that significantly undermines or 
destroys the basic physical and psychological wellbeing of another person. It implicates 
universal facts about our humanity. All of us have basic needs that must be adequately 
satisfied in order for us to maintain a minimum level of physiological and psychological 
wellbeing. To frustrate or ignore deliberately the basic needs of other human beings – which 
are legitimate and inevitable in light of their humanity – is essentially a form of flagrant 
disrespect or disregard for their human worth. In that sense, such harm is dehumanizing. 
Examples of dehumanizing harm are similar to those cited in the other harm accounts: the 
imposing of prolonged hunger, thirst, and severe physical pain, inducement of debilitating 
trauma, infliction of unrelenting terror and harassment, degradation of one’s sense of dignity 
and self-worth. Victims usually find it hard to recover from dehumanizing harm; the damages 
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done are often irreversible and beyond compensation (Card, 2010, p. 7; Formosa, 2008, p. 
229). 
On my view, inflicting or risking the infliction of death on another person amounts to 
evil in the absence of a good moral reason, since all human beings presumably have intrinsic 
worth. Hence, killing any one of them without a good moral reason necessarily counts as evil, 
for it is unmistakably a manifestation of disrespect or disregard for human life. Thus 
understood, it does not matter whether death is imposed on another in a cruel or painless 
manner. Imagine that X kills many innocent people painlessly just for the fun of it. He 
obviously has no regard for human life, as killing others seems to be a form of amusement to 
him; therefore, his actions are indisputably evil. Yet, they may be judged less evil than those 
of another who imposes agonizing death on others just for the fun of it. 
On my view, there is a sort of humiliation that counts as dehumanizing harm – what I 
call dehumanizing humiliation. Such humiliation is distinct from other sorts of humiliation in 
that it is meant to damage another’s sense of dignity and self-worth, such that it leaves behind 
a deep psychological scar from which the victim requires an extended period of time to 
recover. If the humiliation imposed on the victim merely hurts but do not damage his sense of 
dignity and self-worth, it does not amount to dehumanizing humiliation – and so may not 
count as evil on my theory, other things being equal. 
On that note, dehumanizing harm, on my theory, necessarily implies a significant amount 
of physiological and psychological damages. For instance, depriving someone of food for one 
day or mildly humiliating another does not count as dehumanizing harm, for it is not severe 
enough. That evil actions bring dehumanizing harm or death to another is in line with evil 
being a phenomenon of extraordinary moral gravity. Under the victim component, then, a 
condition of evil is met when the victims actually suffer dehumanizing harm or death. That 
said, there is one exception: in the presence of monstrous motives (e.g. malevolence, sadism, 
64 
 
perverse lust), this condition of harm will be rendered unnecessary. I will elaborate in a later 
section. 
 
5.3 The Perpetrator Component 
5.3.1 Intention 
In my opinion, when the perpetrator has the intention to dehumanize another and does it 
intentionally, or he foresees that others will be dehumanized as a result of his action, a 
condition of evil is fulfilled. To elaborate on intention, the perpetrator not only must have a 
direct intention to dehumanize or kill another, he must also do it intentionally.12 For it is 
possible that the perpetrator fails to have a direct intention to dehumanize or kill another but 
does it intentionally, or that he has a direct intention to dehumanize or kill another but does it 
unintentionally. When this happens, the action does not seem evil. To illustrate the former: 
suppose X has no intention to kill his young cousin Y but is forced at gunpoint to do so. 
Treasuring his life more than Y’s, X pulls the trigger and kills Y. To be sure, X kills Y 
intentionally but he has no direct intention to do so. Since X has no direct intention to kill Y 
but is forced into it, it does not seem right to morally condemn his action in the strongest 
degree. To illustrate the latter: suppose X has the intention to kill his young cousin, Y, who is 
an orphan, as he is after Y’s multi-billion inheritance (X is the closest kin to Y). His plan is to 
drown Y in a river after fetching Y from school. While he is driving, he accidentally hits a 
boy who is running across the road. That boy, who dies on the spot, turns out to be his cousin. 
Although X has the intention to kill Y, he does not kill him intentionally in this case. This is 
because Y’s death fails to happen ‘in the right way’: X’s plan is to drown him and not to run 
him over with his car. His intention to kill his cousin does not, so to speak, bring about or 
cause the road accident in which his cousin dies. In other words, the causal chain from 
intention to action to consequence fails to follow the right sort of route – such a situation is 
                                                            
12 Clearly, the notions of having a direct intention to do something and doing something intentionally 
do not exhaust all the aspects of the structure of intention. Rather, I think they are the ones relevant to 




often referred to as wayward or deviant causal chain (Brand, 1984, pp. 17-18; Davidson, 
1980, pp. 78, 87; Searle, 1999, pp. 61, 135-140). Since his action of killing Y is accidental, 
we cannot rightly say that he kills Y intentionally by running him over with his car. Hence, 
even though his unintentional action produces the intended consequence (i.e. Y’s death), it 
does not seem evil.13 Nonetheless, I think we can rightly condemn X’s intention to kill Y in 
the highest degree because it reflects a disregard for Y’s human worth. 
Yet, there are certain cases of deviant causal chain that may pose some difficulties to our 
assessment of evil actions. Suppose X tries to kill Y using a pistol. He shoots at Y while Y is 
crossing a busy road but, being a terrible shot, misses him totally. It follows that the sound of 
the gunshot distracts Y such that Y fails to notice a car travelling at high speed towards him in 
the middle of the road and is run over by it; he subsequently dies from his injuries. At first 
sight, X’s action of killing Y appears unintentional: Y’s death is not caused by the bullet but, 
rather, by a fast moving car from which he fails to dodge in time. The situation thus looks like 
a case of deviant causal chain. Although it does not seem right to say that X’s killing of Y is 
unintentional, one can still plausibly say that X’s attempt to kill Y is intentional. This is 
because X has, so to speak, arrived at “the moment of consummation”: he is acting with the 
intention of killing Y and not acting with the intention of putting himself in a position 
wherein he can subsequently kill Y (Chisholm, 1970, p. 641). Hence, there is clearly an 
intentional element present in this case, despite the anomaly in the causal chain. 
That said, it is not necessary that, in order to meet a condition for evil under this 
component, the perpetrator must have the intention to dehumanize or kill another and must do 
it intentionally. Even if the perpetrator merely foresees that another will be dehumanized or 
killed as a result of his action, his action fulfills a condition for evil on my theory. For such 
behavior also seems to reflect sufficient disregard for human worth and life.  Suppose P is the 
owner of a construction company and takes up a project to build residential apartments in an 
                                                            
13 But this is not to say that we cannot condemn X’s character as evil. Recall the point made in my 
critique of Formosa in Chapter 4: we should keep our assessments of action and character separate. 
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earthquake zone. Greedy for a greater margin of profits, P fails to adhere strictly to the 
standards required in the construction of buildings in an earthquake zone, as doing so will 
make his building costs go up considerably. And he foresees that, in the event of a strong 
quake, it is very likely that these residential buildings will collapse and consequently cause 
the death of many residents. But he does not let it bother him and proceeds to build the 
apartments using cheap and inferior materials. Here, we have a case of a lack of intention to 
harm another: P does not intend to kill the residents – his intention is only to earn greater 
profits. He merely foresees that his actions may cost many lives. If the apartments, for some 
reason, are able to withstand a strong quake, P need not say “I have failed” but rather “I was 
mistaken” (Searle, 1999, p. 103). Yet, the fact that he can foresee the loss of many innocent 
lives should the buildings collapse and still proceeds with his actions anyway shows that he 
has very little regard for the lives of others. And since he is seriously risking the death of 
many innocent people, which, in this case, has a high probability of occurrence, just for the 
sake of making more money, his action deserves our strongest moral condemnation. Hence, 
on my theory, the perpetrator’s ability to foresee dehumanizing harm or death satisfies a 
condition for evil in case he has no direct intention to harm another. 
 
5.3.2 Affect 
The other necessary condition under the perpetrator component is what I call monstrous 
affect. It refers primarily to the perpetrator’s indifference to or delight in the suffering of 
others, or his lack of sufficient apologetic feelings for it. Such affective state is monstrous 
precisely because it lacks a humane dimension and reflects a flagrant disregard for human 
worth. Surely, if one has no regard for human worth and life, it will be expressed in one’s 
affect in a way that is unmistakable. Furthermore, indifference and perverse delight must also 
be felt in sufficient intensity in order for them to count as monstrous. Admittedly, it will be 
unreasonable to regard a tinge of indifference or pleasure as sinister. Hence, in order for the 
condition of monstrous affect to be met, the perpetrator must feel a sufficient amount of 
monstrous affect during the whole course of performing his harmful action. That said, I do not 
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thereby imply that an evildoer must not even feel a tinge of pity or sympathy for their victims 
during his action. Even psychopaths are reported to have fleeting, shallow feelings of remorse 
and pity (Hare, 1993, pp. 52-56). Hence, I permit that an evildoer may, at some moment, feel 
a tinge of sympathy for his victims as he inflicts harm upon them. But monstrous affect must 
be the dominant one during the commission of his acts. So long as a perpetrator has 
monstrous affect at the time he acts, a condition of evil is satisfied on my theory. 
On the other hand, it seems to detract from the evilness of an action when the perpetrator 
feels genuine and intense apologetic emotions such as pity and sorrow at the time he acts. For 
they are emotions that are humane and do not seem congruous with utter disregard for human 
worth. Of course, the perpetrator must genuinely have these emotions and must feel them 
deeply during the time of his action. Shallow feelings do not count as they come and go easily. 
Thus, a shallow or fleeting feeling of pity or sympathy will not do, for it is possible that most 
evildoers could have moments when they feel a tinge of pity for their victims as they inflict 
harm on them. At any rate, it seems apparent that genuine and deep apologetic feelings at the 
time of the action do not reflect flagrant disregard for human worth, as it does not seem 
possible for one to feel genuine and intense sympathy for one’s victims when one has little or 
no regard for them. The point is, monstrous affect must be present in sufficient amount during 
the action in order to satisfy this second psychological condition. 
 
5.3.3 Motive 
Generally, insofar as the motive that causes revolting behavior is deplorable, the fourth 
condition of evil on my theory is satisfied. And it does not matter whether they are common 
motives (e.g. greed) or diabolical ones (e.g. malevolence). I agree with Card and Formosa that 
both banal and diabolical motives are capable of causing horrific acts. However, as argued in 
previous chapters, I think there is a place to specify and give more weight to diabolical 
motives in the moral evaluation of evil actions. For such motives carry with them a sinister 
quality that is usually absent in relatively normal motives. Hence, I think a robust theory of 
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evil actions should differentiate between monstrous motives and ordinary motives, as the 
former seem to constitute a distinct class of motives that are bound to evoke a sense of evil in 
most cases where little or no harm ensues. Some obvious examples are malevolence, sadism 
and perverse sexual lust. 
In light of their sinister quality, then, monstrous motives, together with the other two 
proposed perpetrator factors, would seem substantial enough to render actions evil even 
though no harm results. To see this, recall the illustration used in my argument against Card 
in Chapter 2: an agent plants a bomb at a kindergarten with the intention to kill the children 
there just to vent his anger against the society. It still seems plausible to attribute evil to his 
action based on his monstrous psychology even though the bomb fails to explode due to a 
technical fault. Consider another example: an agent, without being provoked, is motivated to 
shoot his peace-loving neighbour to death just because it is wrong to do so; but unbeknownst 
to him, his neighbour happens to wear a bullet-proof vest on that fateful day. Hence, although 
the agent gleefully fires many shots at his neighbour, he actually causes no harm. Even so, 
many would probably still find his action somewhat sinister due to the monstrosity of his 
motive and affect. Therefore, it seems that an action that results in little or no harm can still 
plausibly count as evil when it is driven by monstrous motives and performed in a state of 
monstrous affect. 
On my theory, then, motives count as evil insofar as they are deplorable, and together 
with the other three proposed conditions of evil, will render an action evil. But monstrous 
psychological qualities, in view of their substantial weight, would obviate the need for the 
condition of dehumanizing harm or death to be met in a judgment of evil. 
 
5.4 Application 
Bringing the four conditions together, evil actions, on my theory, are actions that are 
motivated by deplorable motives to dehumanize or kill another, or in which dehumanizing 
harm or death is foreseeable, performed in a state of monstrous affect, and resulting in 
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dehumanizing harm or death. This is the principal application of my theory. Another 
application is this: when an action is performed from monstrous motive and in a state of 
monstrous affect, it is considered evil regardless of whether dehumanizing harm or death 
results. As I have given a few examples on monstrous psychology in the previous section, I 
shall concentrate on the principal application of my theory here. 
Consider Hitler’s genocidal actions. It is clear that the Jews suffered dehumanizing harm 
and death during the Holocaust: they were made to live in unimaginably filthy conditions, 
viciously humiliated and harassed, starved to death, killed in an undignified manner and 
denied decent burial – all these were imposed on them without any good moral reason. Hence, 
the condition of dehumanizing harm is fulfilled. In addition, Hitler clearly had the intention to 
annihilate the Jewish people in a dehumanizing fashion and he did it intentionally by ordering 
and encouraging the genocide to happen. Furthermore, throughout the execution of the 
genocide, he remained indifferent to the unspeakable sufferings of the Jews. He also seemed 
to be motivated by deep-seated hatred and malice against this people. Hence, the three 
necessary conditions under the perpetrator component – i.e. intention, affect and motive – are 
met. Given that the four conditions of evil actions are fulfilled, Hitler’s genocidal actions 
rightly deserve our strongest moral condemnation. Hence, it seems that my theory is able to 
account adequately what most people would regard as an epitomic case of evil. 
I shall now apply my theory to what Formosa considers to be a hard case, namely, the 
case of the remorseful pedophile who regularly exploits children. Recall Formosa suggests 
that the outcome of the assessment could go either way – wrong or evil – because the 
pedophile’s remorseful response and difficult upbringing appear to blur the boundary between 
wrong and evil. I have explained why his argument is untenable in Chapter 4. Let us see 
whether my theory is able to give a persuasive account of this case. Clearly, the sexual abuse 
of children amounts to dehumanizing harm because it is psychologically very traumatizing for 
the young minds; in particular, it deeply violates their dignity and seriously undermine their 
sense of self-worth. Thus, the condition of harm is satisfied. Furthermore, the remorseful 
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pedophile clearly has the intention to sexually abuse the children and he does it intentionally. 
He also seems indifferent to the human value of his young victims, for he apparently treats 
them as sexual objects during the commission of his actions. Lastly, it seems obvious that the 
pedophile is motivated by perverse sexual desires. The three necessary conditions under the 
perpetrator component are, thus, fulfilled. In the final analysis, the remorseful pedophile’s 
actions, having clearly met the four conditions of evil on my theory, deserve our strongest 
moral condemnation. His regret or remorse after each act of sexual exploitation should not 
affect this outcome – though it may affect the degree of evilness of his actions. This seems a 
more reasonable and plausible assessment than Formosa’s. 
Furthermore, my theory seems compatible with the qualitative thesis. In Chapter 1, I have 
argued that there is also a qualitative difference – and not just a quantitative one – between 
evil and wrong actions, and that a robust theory of evil actions should be able to support such 
a difference. The proposed theory seems up to the task. Under this particular conception, evil 
actions are qualitatively distinct from other kinds of wrongdoing in that they are actions that 
manifest flagrant disrespect or disregard for the human worth or life of another. Evildoers 
either intentionally bring about dehumanizing harm or death from deplorable motives or 
foresee that dehumanizing harm or death may result as a side effect but still proceed with the 
action, because they enjoy seeing others suffer, are indifferent to their sufferings, or have 
insufficient apologetic feelings for others’ sufferings. Ordinary wrongs, on the other hand, do 
not seem to contain such sinister elements – at least not all in a single action. Consider the 
actions of a shoplifter and a malevolent mass murderer. Applying my theory, the qualitative 
difference between them becomes immediately evident. The mass murderer, driven by 
bloodlust, goes on a shooting spree and intentionally kills many innocent people; clearly, he 
has little regard for the human worth of his victims. In contrast, the shoplifter’s action of 
stealing some items from a shop does not appear to be a manifestation of flagrant disrespect 
for the human worth of another. Hence, it seems that my theory is able to adequately account 
for the qualitative nature of evil actions. 
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5.5 Possible Objections 
I shall now address two possible objections that one may raise against my theory. First, 
suppose the pedophile fails to enjoy his acts of sexually exploiting the children; instead, he 
feels intense sorrow and pity for the children the whole time he sexually abuses them. Despite 
his genuine sympathetic feelings, he fails to relent or stop harming the children. Clearly, his 
apologetic feelings during the action are different from his remorseful feelings after the action. 
And since the pedophile’s actions are done in the absence of monstrous affect, the condition 
of monstrous affect fails to obtain. Hence, assuming the other three conditions are met, his 
actions will not come out evil on my theory because the necessary condition of affect is not 
satisfied. Yet, one might object, such an outcome is counterintuitive. After all, he directly 
intends to harm the children and actually imposes dehumanizing harm on them; his motive is 
also deeply vile. 
I think the counterintuitiveness of the outcome can be lessened significantly by 
considering the fact that we can still give our strongest moral condemnation to the 
pedophile’s intention, motive and the consequences of his actions. After all, they are 
conditions of evil on my theory. In this case, three out of four conditions are satisfied. The 
only thing is that his actions as a whole, in the absence of monstrous affect, do not warrant the 
label of evil. However, it is important to note that this lesser judgment in no way implies that 
the pedophile’s actions are excusable or the harm done is trivial. In fact, on a moral 
continuum, his actions may just be a hairline away from the threshold of evil. The point is, 
monstrous affect carries with it a sinister quality that is commensurate with the notion of 
flagrant disregard for human worth or life. The perpetrator’s humane feelings during his 
action, on the other hand, seem to be at odds with this notion. Rather, they seem to be a sign 
of sufficient regard for another. 
Second, one might contend that only moral monsters such as the psychopaths seem 
capable of having monstrous affect during their actions. After all, research findings in 
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psychology suggest that the psychopaths’ affective mechanism is deficient; this may well 
account for their capacity for monstrous affect (Nichols, 2002, pp. 299-301). So it does not 
seem possible that ordinary people, given their normal affective system, can have monstrous 
affect. Yet, if we think ordinary people can and do perform hideous acts, the implication is 
that my theory will be unable to render such acts performed by ordinary people evil, since 
monstrous affect is a necessary condition on my theory. This would then limit the usefulness 
of my theory, as it could only be applied to the actions of moral monsters. 
However, I think it is far from clear that ordinary decent folks cannot and do not have the 
capacity for monstrous affect. Consider the case of the Holocaust. Apparently, most of the 
German military and police conscripts who willingly carried out the massacres of the Jewish 
people at the Eastern Front were ordinary people who led relatively decent lives and held 
respectable jobs in the society before and after the war (Browning, 1992; Goldhagen, 1996). 
Notwithstanding, they reportedly enjoyed killing the Jews or were indifferent to their 
unspeakable sufferings and horrible deaths. Perhaps, this proves that even ordinary people 
who presumably do not have a deficient affective mechanism can nonetheless lapse into a 
deficient affective state, albeit temporarily. Hence, that monstrous affect is exclusive to the 
psychopaths or moral monsters does not seem convincing or reasonable. 
Therefore, in my opinion, this theory makes a robust theory of evil actions based on the 
proposed criteria. First, it adopts a balanced approach. Second, it takes into account several 
factors that accord well with common intuitions, namely harm and the perpetrator’s intention, 
affect, and motive. Affect, often ignored in most accounts of evil actions, conveys what seems 
to be the most sinister aspect of evil; that the perpetrator takes pleasure in or is indifferent to 
the hideousness of his actions is likely to strike most of us as specially horrifying. On my 
account, the evildoer’s structure of intention is given a detailed analysis not found in any of 
the six theories. My theory is also able to capture the general sense that monstrous motives 
carry with them sufficient weight to render actions evil – provided that monstrous affect is 
also present – even though little or no harm ensues. Third, it is useful to identify evil actions 
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because it seems able to demarcate a sufficiently sharp boundary between evil and wrong 
actions based on the notion of flagrant disrespect for the human worth and life of another 
person. 
In this chapter, I offer a theory of evil actions that stipulates four conditions for evil 
actions – briefly, the infliction of dehumanizing harm or death, the intention to dehumanize 
another, monstrous affect and deplorable motive. On my view, evil actions are essentially a 
manifestation of flagrant disregard or disrespect for the human worth and life of another. But 
in cases where actions are driven by monstrous motives and performed with monstrous affect, 
they can plausibly be considered evil even though little or no harm results. I have argued that 
monstrous psychological factors carry sufficient weight to render actions evil. Additionally, I 
have applied the proposed theory to two cases; it seems able to give a convincing and 
adequate characterization of the evilness found in them. I have also noted that this conception 
is compatible with the qualitative thesis and appears to adequately meet the three conditions 













This thesis aims to sketch out a robust theory of evil actions that accords with the strong 
sense of evil in ordinary moral discourse. I have proposed three conditions that such a theory 
should meet: balance, intuitive plausibility and usefulness. I think formulating a theory of evil 
actions based on these conditions is in line with the principle of reflective equilibrium, for one 
is reminded not to over-rely on intuitions or rational principles. To achieve the aim of this 
thesis, I have selected six contemporary theories of evil actions for critical assessment and 
insights into the nature of evil actions. My analysis has revealed that these theories fail to 
satisfy the three conditions for a robust theory of evil actions adequately. Nevertheless, they 
have provided me with valuable ideas that contribute to the development and strengthening of 
my account. Put simply, my theory advances the view of evil actions as a manifestation of 
flagrant disregard or disrespect for the human worth and life of another. Such a conception, as 
argued in the last chapter, seems to fulfil the three conditions adequately and is compatible 
with the qualitative thesis. 
That said, I do not pretend that my theory is perfect. There is one limitation I can 
immediately think of: it fails to capture the evilness of cruelty against animals. For its 
fundamental assumption is that human beings have intrinsic worth; and my contention is that 
showing flagrant disrespect for human worth is something of such enormous moral gravity 
that it warrants our strongest moral condemnation. Yet, animals clearly cannot be 
dehumanized. This being so, I must concede that my theory can only be applied to evil 
actions against human beings. Notwithstanding, I am inclined to say – and I think most people 
would too – that harming animals for gratuitous reasons (e.g. torturing them for fun) is evil. 
Hence, there is clearly room for further development of my theory – or, perhaps, a separate 
theory – to characterize evil actions against animals. On such a theory, it is perhaps sufficient 
to consider just the harm factor, as the perpetrator factor may not be crucial to a judgment of 
evil in the case of animals. The rationale is this: animals appear to have a simple psychology 
that is solely concerned with pleasure and pain – physical torment may well be the worst 
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thing ever for them. For, unlike human beings, they do not seem to have the mental capacity 
to look beyond their present situation or the mental resilience to endure pain. Besides this 
deficiency, I am sure there are others that I fail to notice. Following Rawls, I think “all 
theories are presumably mistaken in places”; the question is “how often and how far” a theory 
is mistaken (1999, p. 45). In light of my current level of understanding of evil actions, I would 
say that my theory, as compared with the other six theories analyzed in this thesis, appears to 
best approximate our considered moral judgments of evil actions. I hope this assertion has 
been well argued for in the thesis. Of course, the validity of this assertion is limited to six 
theories found in contemporary literature on the topic. 
 Yet, to capture evil in a theory of evil actions, it seems to me, necessarily results in 
simplications – more or less – of our intuitive understanding of it. For evil is, after all, a thick 
and complex concept, and I do not pretend to have thoroughly grasped it. Nevertheless, I hope 
this thesis has, to some extent, enriched our understanding of this phenomenon that forms an 
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